The Army’s Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas publishes a professional journal called Military Review. I came across their web site http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/ (click on past editions) which has posted their archives going back to 1922. Many of the articles and book reviews are interesting to read. For example compare the two reviews below from 1922.
Mike Moore
WHAT CAVALRY-DO WE NEED?
Digest of an article, by Gen. Kbtllnt (?), which appeared in the CCM W Journal, April, 1922 p. 206. (The digest is copied in full below. The author asks pointedly the question: Are there indispensable missions which only cavalry can fulfill in modern warfare? The screening of mobilization and exploration are first considered. While some brilliant officers profess that aviation will accomplish these important tasks, the writer calls attention to the fact that aviation is effective only by day, when the weather is favorable and the sky is not too low. Moreover, the air service only discovers what the enemy will permit to be seen. This was, proved by the German secret concentration before the great offensives of 1918. Then, it is not sufficient to discover only main bodies. Identification by prisoners or documents is necessary: The writer then considers briefly the use of armored automobiles and tanks, but concludes ‘that these, will not suffice for this role. “’Only one arm today; the cavalry, can, go far and fast over all country, with powerful measures of fire-that is to say, combat. It; alone can assure its own security, and its supporting troops, if there be any, can” fight and, take prisoners. Aviation and T.S.F. (wireless telegraphy) will enable it to transmit its information almost instantaneously. Whatever the weather, the cavalry can not only assure the security of our mobilization, but will hinder the enemy concentrations.” The author next considers the use of cavalry on the service of security at a distance, and concludes that cavalry alone can assure the safe accomplishment of strategic maneuvers. Other sections are devoted to operations on the flanks and in the enemy’s rear, intervention in battle, the cavalry strategic reserve, the pursuit, cavalry against cavalry, mode of action, mobility, fire power of cavalry, war organization, large units, and cavalry combat against infantry.
PROBLEMS OF MECHANICAL WARFARE
By Col: J. F. C. Fuller, D. KS. O. 18 pages.—. Jan., 1922, p. 284.
This is an interesting article, by a tank enthusiast, predicting the developments in the use of tanks and the future increase in the mobility of combat and supply units by means of mechanical transportation.
In August, 1914, the tactical mobility of the armies was based on muscle-the infantry marched, the cavalry
rode, the guns were dragged by horses, and, except for a few lorries and airplanes, the soldiers were scarcely more
mobile than their ancestors at Waterloo. The war which followed as different from preceding wars, in that the railway, the great civil means of-movement, was at once turned to strategically account. Where the railways were numerous, fronts became contiguous, as in France and Flanders; where few were broken, as in Russia. In rail less countries, operations were of the same war type. In the days of Alexander, as soon as the ranks were broken by the infantry, pursuit by cavalry clinched the victory. With trenches protected by entanglements rendering advance almost impossible, it became necessary in the World War to use tanks to charge, disorganize and demoralize the enemy, and then the infantry advanced to drive the enemy from the field. In this reversal of the historic method of attack is to be discovered the germ of a great number of our future problems. The tanks carried out, therefore, the primary duty of the infantry, namely, the disorganization of the enemy. The cavalry attempted to “pursue, ,but failed consistently, on the western front, as they could not face the machine gun; the infantry attempted to ‘pursue, but failed equally because of their lack of mobility; finally, the tanks attempted to pursue, but also failed because they did not possess the necessary radius of action and the requisite mobility to protect themselves against the enemy’s gunfire. In wars of the future it may be expected that tanks will be developed with sufficient speed and radius ‘of action to take the roles now played by the cavalry, infantry and artillery. A light cavalry tank with a speed of 25 miles an hour will certainly replace the cavalry and infantry of the past infantry of maneuver, and the artillery will be drawn by tractors and probably placed in tanks so that it can provide for its own local protection. The armored tank will create a tactical’ condition similar to that -created in the past by armored knights, and infantry will continue to exist, but only as defenders of positions, railheads, bridgeheads, workshops ‘and supply magazines. A purely defensive weapon to assist in holding positions may be provided & tank mine layers, which in turn would cause the development of lank mine sweepers. In order to have the troops necessary to occupy important positions, tank transporters will be provided; these will be lightly armored and made gas proof, and endowed with sufficient speed to enable them to escape from their, strongholds should the tank mine sweepers succeed in clearing a way through the mine fields. AS warfare will become more and more mobile in nature, fast-digging cross-country, trench diggers will be provided, so that, when halted, the infantry and their transporters will be able to seek cover by ground in order to protect themselves from aircraft attack. Even with an army at the present time road bound army-the cross-country supply transporter can reduce the length of the marching columns, can reduce the weight carried by the soldier, arid can enable him when deployed to remain deployed and be provided with shelter, hot meals drinks and the hundred and one requisites which differentiate civilized warfare from the combat of barbarians. This will be much more the case in tank warfare of the future. The use of tanks in small wars will greatly assist in covering. large areas in a short time, materially decreasing the length of the war, making supply more certain, and 7 preventing frequent outbreaks of outlaw bands. Tanks require no feed when not in use, and when perfected as we may reasonably expect, will have a decided influence on the size of our armies. Attack of defended harbors may be made. as a surprise by using floatable tanks which can be launched from ships, under cover of darkness, at points some distance from the harbor to be captured. They could then crawl up the beach, and, supported by aircraft, open their attack the same evening. Aerial attacks on air-centers, landing grounds, repair shops and aircraft factories may be made much more effective by having fast tanks, of great cruising radius, accompany the aircraft on their raids, assaulting complete destruction. The increased interest of many nations in tank development, and the number of tank battalions being maintained assures the future use of these weapons in ever increasing numbers. Many artillery horses are being replaced by tractors, and mechanical transportation may be expected to change the wars of the future.