I just finished this fine book by Jared Diamond. He uses the book to answer a question posed to him, "Why do some societies have so much and others have so little?" He proposes an answer that says, "Because a fortuitious combination of environmental factors means that some some societies will be rich and others poor."
In presenting his thesis he makes a convincing case for environment as the primary factor in determining the relative wealth of a society. While there are some things to "pick on" in his defense of his thesis it's very thought provoking and worth the time to read.
I've also started his subsequent work, "Collapse: How Societies Choose." He seems to be building on the GGS thesis. I'll report on that one when I'm done! [:)]
Bill Kambic
Mangalarga Marchador: Uma raça, uma paixão
Guns, Germs, and Steel
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Joseph Sullivan
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Bill:
Not sure I follow. Does he mean environment as in water, fertility and mineral wealth, or doses he mean the political environment and the culture? If the latter, he needs to walk from San Diego to Tiajuana, or ask himself why resource-poor, heavily-populated Japan is far richer than resource rich heavily populated Latin America, or why the Indian sub-continent is beginning to emerge as an economic power with no change in climate, resources or people (except for more people and more strains on the resources).
Joe
Not sure I follow. Does he mean environment as in water, fertility and mineral wealth, or doses he mean the political environment and the culture? If the latter, he needs to walk from San Diego to Tiajuana, or ask himself why resource-poor, heavily-populated Japan is far richer than resource rich heavily populated Latin America, or why the Indian sub-continent is beginning to emerge as an economic power with no change in climate, resources or people (except for more people and more strains on the resources).
Joe
And what about Hong Kong, which has very little in the way of space or resources but is an economic powerhouse? Culture, ideas and attitude make a ton of difference.
Monique MacNaughton
<i>Stories that begin with "Last seen in a bar" generally don't end well!</i>
Monique MacNaughton
<i>Stories that begin with "Last seen in a bar" generally don't end well!</i>
By "environment," Joe, he means the natural assets available to a people living in a given area (water, arable land, wild crops and animals available for possible domestication, etc. He also looks over a historical period of 13,000 years or so.
Monique, Hong Kong has what is has because of critical events that happened in China 8000 years ago or so. At least according to Diamond. [;)]
If you Google him you'll find some reviews of the book that are far better than mine. Read the book and you won't need reviews!!!!!
Bill Kambic
Mangalarga Marchador: Uma raça, uma paixão
Monique, Hong Kong has what is has because of critical events that happened in China 8000 years ago or so. At least according to Diamond. [;)]
If you Google him you'll find some reviews of the book that are far better than mine. Read the book and you won't need reviews!!!!!
Bill Kambic
Mangalarga Marchador: Uma raça, uma paixão
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Pat Holscher
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I have not read the book, so I'm unhampered by actually knowing what it says, which gives me free rein!
Ironically, I think that this thesis is both perfectly correct, and definately wrong at the same time.
The factor of environmental advantage is often ignored by countries when they rise. The temptation to ignore it is great, although there's usually some acknowledgement of it. Still, countries like the US, Canada, Australia, etc., have great advantages in modern times because they had huge resources, small populations for landmass, well educated populations, and ready access to land. That's a big advantage over other countries. It's easy to discount it, until one or more of those elements disappears, at which time it becomes more apparent.
On the other hand, there's been countries with all of those advantages that have not risen. In that case, it's normally due to some internal failure that prevents. There's no history allowing the country to exploit its advantages.
So, in the end, Diamond and Hanson are both right.
Pat
Ironically, I think that this thesis is both perfectly correct, and definately wrong at the same time.
The factor of environmental advantage is often ignored by countries when they rise. The temptation to ignore it is great, although there's usually some acknowledgement of it. Still, countries like the US, Canada, Australia, etc., have great advantages in modern times because they had huge resources, small populations for landmass, well educated populations, and ready access to land. That's a big advantage over other countries. It's easy to discount it, until one or more of those elements disappears, at which time it becomes more apparent.
On the other hand, there's been countries with all of those advantages that have not risen. In that case, it's normally due to some internal failure that prevents. There's no history allowing the country to exploit its advantages.
So, in the end, Diamond and Hanson are both right.
Pat
I guess in many ways this is a continuation of the "nature-nurture" debate. Frankly, the preponderance of the evidence seems to favor "nature" in this circumstance. I guess reasonable minds could differ, but there it is! [;)]
Britain and Japan are both island nations. While Britain creates one the largest empires ever seen Japan turns introspective, closes it's doors, bans recently introduced technologies (like firearms), and remains so until forced open by American cannon. Diamond cites two circumstances that might explain the difference.
One follows his "environment is all" theory by noting that Britain lies a very few miles off the European continent and that geography means that it will always be significantly influenced by Continental developments. Japan lies 120 miles from the Asian mainland, meaning that it is significantly more isolated.
A second reason for Japan's isolation could have been the reaction of the samurai class to technological innovation. Japan at this time was a unified state under the shogun and emperor. Firearms were introduced by the Portuguese in about 1650 (dates here will be approximate; the book was from the library and has gone home). It took years of training to become a competent samurai warrior, with an emphasis on swordsmanship. Firearms meant that a peasant with a few months of training could effectively kill a warrior with years of training. The samurai had a choice: accept the new technology (meaning abandon a lot of tradition and lore) or suppress it (and prevent any effective challenge to their power). They chose the latter. It worked because Japan was a state under central control. Once the shogun and emperor "signed on" (and they did so because that peasant with a firearm was a threat to them, too) the elimination of the threatening technology was fairly easy to do. There was no competing organizational base that could effectively oppose the samurai carrying out the shogun's decree. Distance would keep “technological re-infection” at a minimum.
In Britain you had far less centralization during the period of firearm development. Indeed, there were many civil and dynastic wars where the combatants actively sought the most advance weapons technology they could find. So even if the two major power centers (Crown and Church) had joined together to order the abandonment of firearms they would likely have been ignored by others who had interests in using such technologies (like the nominally Catholic Scots).
And, here Diamond's "heavy hand of environment" would again make itself felt. Even if Crown and Church HAD been able to suppress firearms in the British Isles, they are only 20 miles from France. That's not a long distance for a motivated smuggler before the age of modern communications. Such an approach would also have rendered the Crown defenseless against the growing use of firearms by Continental powers (where Japan's 120 mile ocean "moat" gave them a level of confidence that they would not be troubled by continental powers).
Discussion of the “character” of groups or societies is VERY un-PC. It can, and has, lead to conclusions that one group or another is “inferior” because they did or did not develop some technology or adopt some practice. Once a “superior” group becomes dominant over an “inferior” group we’ve seen some REALLY bad things happen, right down to modern times. Still, there has to be some exploration of this aspect of the problem. Diamond only approaches it peripherally (in some of his discussions of China and Japan). It may or may not be a serious weakness, depending upon who you view his central thesis.
He does have a second book that builds on the first entitled <u>Collapse: How Societies Choose</u>. I’ve started it but am not far enough along to make any real comment.
I think GGS is a very interesting book and certainly challenges some long held interpretations of historical events. Humans are complicated enough that two different groups in the same type of environment can come up with two different ways to approach the same problem. That is a challenge to Diamond’s thesis, but does not, IMO, disprove it. It just proves that we humans are resourceful, if nothing else.
I say again, read the book. You’ll be glad you did! [:)]
Bill Kambic
Mangalarga Marchador: Uma raça, uma paixão
Britain and Japan are both island nations. While Britain creates one the largest empires ever seen Japan turns introspective, closes it's doors, bans recently introduced technologies (like firearms), and remains so until forced open by American cannon. Diamond cites two circumstances that might explain the difference.
One follows his "environment is all" theory by noting that Britain lies a very few miles off the European continent and that geography means that it will always be significantly influenced by Continental developments. Japan lies 120 miles from the Asian mainland, meaning that it is significantly more isolated.
A second reason for Japan's isolation could have been the reaction of the samurai class to technological innovation. Japan at this time was a unified state under the shogun and emperor. Firearms were introduced by the Portuguese in about 1650 (dates here will be approximate; the book was from the library and has gone home). It took years of training to become a competent samurai warrior, with an emphasis on swordsmanship. Firearms meant that a peasant with a few months of training could effectively kill a warrior with years of training. The samurai had a choice: accept the new technology (meaning abandon a lot of tradition and lore) or suppress it (and prevent any effective challenge to their power). They chose the latter. It worked because Japan was a state under central control. Once the shogun and emperor "signed on" (and they did so because that peasant with a firearm was a threat to them, too) the elimination of the threatening technology was fairly easy to do. There was no competing organizational base that could effectively oppose the samurai carrying out the shogun's decree. Distance would keep “technological re-infection” at a minimum.
In Britain you had far less centralization during the period of firearm development. Indeed, there were many civil and dynastic wars where the combatants actively sought the most advance weapons technology they could find. So even if the two major power centers (Crown and Church) had joined together to order the abandonment of firearms they would likely have been ignored by others who had interests in using such technologies (like the nominally Catholic Scots).
And, here Diamond's "heavy hand of environment" would again make itself felt. Even if Crown and Church HAD been able to suppress firearms in the British Isles, they are only 20 miles from France. That's not a long distance for a motivated smuggler before the age of modern communications. Such an approach would also have rendered the Crown defenseless against the growing use of firearms by Continental powers (where Japan's 120 mile ocean "moat" gave them a level of confidence that they would not be troubled by continental powers).
Discussion of the “character” of groups or societies is VERY un-PC. It can, and has, lead to conclusions that one group or another is “inferior” because they did or did not develop some technology or adopt some practice. Once a “superior” group becomes dominant over an “inferior” group we’ve seen some REALLY bad things happen, right down to modern times. Still, there has to be some exploration of this aspect of the problem. Diamond only approaches it peripherally (in some of his discussions of China and Japan). It may or may not be a serious weakness, depending upon who you view his central thesis.
He does have a second book that builds on the first entitled <u>Collapse: How Societies Choose</u>. I’ve started it but am not far enough along to make any real comment.
I think GGS is a very interesting book and certainly challenges some long held interpretations of historical events. Humans are complicated enough that two different groups in the same type of environment can come up with two different ways to approach the same problem. That is a challenge to Diamond’s thesis, but does not, IMO, disprove it. It just proves that we humans are resourceful, if nothing else.
I say again, read the book. You’ll be glad you did! [:)]
Bill Kambic
Mangalarga Marchador: Uma raça, uma paixão
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Joseph Sullivan
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Well. Bill, someone gave me a copy of "Collapse," but maybe I need to read the other first?
BTW, most of the argument above looks cultural to me. Cultural arguments are not about superiority, by the way, they are about the results of various kinds of cultural/political systems.Yo may like the results, or dislike them. For example, there are many who do not like the more or less free and open system that we have, because it tends to emphasize material progress. Others celebrate the freedom that we have and the ability for people to advance themselves. Both sides view the same cultural effects; the difference is in whether those effects are viewed as largely good, or largely bad.
Joe
BTW, most of the argument above looks cultural to me. Cultural arguments are not about superiority, by the way, they are about the results of various kinds of cultural/political systems.Yo may like the results, or dislike them. For example, there are many who do not like the more or less free and open system that we have, because it tends to emphasize material progress. Others celebrate the freedom that we have and the ability for people to advance themselves. Both sides view the same cultural effects; the difference is in whether those effects are viewed as largely good, or largely bad.
Joe
Joe, I would suggest you read GGS first. It lays a lot of the "groundwork" for the more detailed discussions of <u>Collapse</u>.
I guess you have to view culture in two ways. First would be the development of culture in the Fertile Crescent (and a couple of other places) at the end of the last Ice Age (8000-13,000 B.C). Diamond seems to argue that the transition from hunter-gatherer to farmer, driven or facilitated by environment, produces a culture and civilization. Second, we have the migration of that culture and civilization to other parts of Eurasia and Africa (from roughly 8000-2500 B.C). Here you will have a "grafting" of something new onto something old.
By the time you get to Japan in 1650 A.D. there has been a lot of water over the cultural dam and societies have evolved from bands to clans to tribes to states. The environmental specifics have either permitted (or denied) this evolution. Just how that evolution has proceeded will vary based upon both rational factors (physical constraints like climate, water availability, success of domestication of plants and animals, etc.) and non-rational factors (how rulers of increasingly centralized societies react to local events, either political or environmental).
Using China as an example, in the 13th and 14th Centuries (again, I'm guessing on dates as I don't have the book in front of me) China sent large trading fleets of ships (some of which were 300+ feet in length) as far as the east coast of Africa and the Red Sea. Why did they stop? Why didn't they keep on going and meet Vasco de Gama somewhere in the Atlantic as he worked his way south? The reason given by Diamond is political. There was a power struggle in Chinese court and the advocates of foreign trade lost. The winning side not only ended the trading voyages they ordered the destruction of the ships, and the yards that produced them. Indeed, this seems to be part of a general technological retrenchment (after China had been a technological leader in the development of clocks, gunpowder, etc.). Because China was a very centrally controlled state (even in the 13th-15th Centuries) organized opposition to such policies did not exist. Historically, they could not have picked a worse time to become excessively introspective as the “hairy barbarians” from the West were about to arrive in numbers.
Again, my explanation is a pale reflection of Diamond’s reasoning. Reading the book will give a much fuller picture!
Bill Kambic
Mangalarga Marchador: Uma raça, uma paixão
I guess you have to view culture in two ways. First would be the development of culture in the Fertile Crescent (and a couple of other places) at the end of the last Ice Age (8000-13,000 B.C). Diamond seems to argue that the transition from hunter-gatherer to farmer, driven or facilitated by environment, produces a culture and civilization. Second, we have the migration of that culture and civilization to other parts of Eurasia and Africa (from roughly 8000-2500 B.C). Here you will have a "grafting" of something new onto something old.
By the time you get to Japan in 1650 A.D. there has been a lot of water over the cultural dam and societies have evolved from bands to clans to tribes to states. The environmental specifics have either permitted (or denied) this evolution. Just how that evolution has proceeded will vary based upon both rational factors (physical constraints like climate, water availability, success of domestication of plants and animals, etc.) and non-rational factors (how rulers of increasingly centralized societies react to local events, either political or environmental).
Using China as an example, in the 13th and 14th Centuries (again, I'm guessing on dates as I don't have the book in front of me) China sent large trading fleets of ships (some of which were 300+ feet in length) as far as the east coast of Africa and the Red Sea. Why did they stop? Why didn't they keep on going and meet Vasco de Gama somewhere in the Atlantic as he worked his way south? The reason given by Diamond is political. There was a power struggle in Chinese court and the advocates of foreign trade lost. The winning side not only ended the trading voyages they ordered the destruction of the ships, and the yards that produced them. Indeed, this seems to be part of a general technological retrenchment (after China had been a technological leader in the development of clocks, gunpowder, etc.). Because China was a very centrally controlled state (even in the 13th-15th Centuries) organized opposition to such policies did not exist. Historically, they could not have picked a worse time to become excessively introspective as the “hairy barbarians” from the West were about to arrive in numbers.
Again, my explanation is a pale reflection of Diamond’s reasoning. Reading the book will give a much fuller picture!
Bill Kambic
Mangalarga Marchador: Uma raça, uma paixão
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Joseph Sullivan
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China did do just what you say. Of course, the centralism of China, the power of the Mandarins and so on al fall under the "culture" icon in my book.
I guess I have no choice but to read it now.
Joe
I guess I have no choice but to read it now.
Joe
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Pat Holscher
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The television documentary based on this book is on tonight, at 8:00 MST.
Pat
Pat
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kerry savee
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Walter Williams, economics professor at George Mason University, says, "(T)he reason some countries are rich while others are poor is best explained by the amount of personal liberty people have and the extent of government control over economic matters. Rank countries along a spectrum going from those closer to free markets to those where there is extensive government control over economic activity. Those closer to the free market end of the spectrum are not only richer but their people are freer." Williams' assertion puts the discussion in the "culture" category.
Kerry
<i>"ride your horse forward and set him straight"</i> Gustav Steinbrecht
Kerry
<i>"ride your horse forward and set him straight"</i> Gustav Steinbrecht
Prof. Williams might be right. But Spain was once the richest nation on Earth and it was a absolute monarchy. Japan and China were very wealthy societies before the coming of the Hairy Barbarians and they had a strong, central government nominally a monarchy but in fact run by buerocrats. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was once quite wealthy and it was a strong monarchy. Germany was quite wealthy and before unification it was a patchwork of reasonably representative or fairly autocratic states. So while Prof. Williams' theory will resonate with Americans it does not necessarily "hold water" in other cultures.
Bill Kambic
Mangalarga Marchador: Uma raça, uma paixão
Bill Kambic
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kerry savee
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Freedom and government control of economic matters are relative concepts. Could be that the examples you cited were freer and lacked governmental controls relative to their neighbors or other cultures for their time and place. Would be an excellent research project.
Kerry
<i>"ride your horse forward and set him straight"</i> Gustav Steinbrecht
Kerry
<i>"ride your horse forward and set him straight"</i> Gustav Steinbrecht
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Joseph Sullivan
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Actually, Bill, I don't think the facts will bear you out.
Spain's wealth was extracted from the New World by Spaniards who came and had the ability carve out small empires for themselves. There was much freedom in the Spanish New World, although much of it was unofficial -- that is, there were the forms and rules, and then there were the facts on the ground. Despite the centralization of the Empire, slow communications and long distances worked wonders. There are just volumes of documentation of this.
The Austrian Hapsburgs were actually quite pragmatic and allowed their polyglot Emipre a remarkable degree of freedom -- more in fact than most of their successor states.
As to Germany, you have to ask what constitutes national wealth. The German peoples (for as you said, there were many) were not especially wealthy. That and Frederick's wars is the reason for our huge population of people of German descent.
China was a vast land of great riches and even greater poverty The Emperor was wealthy beyond imagination, but the peasants have starved in cycles for as long as China has existed. Why else do you think they learned to eat bugs, birds nests, and other such treats? The national wealth of China, by contrast with the wealth of its elites, is exploding only now, as controls are removed.
And, Kerry is right. there is a fair amount of econoic research on freedom. Turns out, it is relative, and deceptive at a distance. P{eople can be very free under absolute oriental despots, if the despots do not see fit to interfere in daily life and commerce. By the same token, life can be very unfree in democracies that do see fit to meddle in daily life and commerce. To the individual, it does not matter if the stae is democratic or despotic, the effect of the use of state power against him is the same.
Joe
Spain's wealth was extracted from the New World by Spaniards who came and had the ability carve out small empires for themselves. There was much freedom in the Spanish New World, although much of it was unofficial -- that is, there were the forms and rules, and then there were the facts on the ground. Despite the centralization of the Empire, slow communications and long distances worked wonders. There are just volumes of documentation of this.
The Austrian Hapsburgs were actually quite pragmatic and allowed their polyglot Emipre a remarkable degree of freedom -- more in fact than most of their successor states.
As to Germany, you have to ask what constitutes national wealth. The German peoples (for as you said, there were many) were not especially wealthy. That and Frederick's wars is the reason for our huge population of people of German descent.
China was a vast land of great riches and even greater poverty The Emperor was wealthy beyond imagination, but the peasants have starved in cycles for as long as China has existed. Why else do you think they learned to eat bugs, birds nests, and other such treats? The national wealth of China, by contrast with the wealth of its elites, is exploding only now, as controls are removed.
And, Kerry is right. there is a fair amount of econoic research on freedom. Turns out, it is relative, and deceptive at a distance. P{eople can be very free under absolute oriental despots, if the despots do not see fit to interfere in daily life and commerce. By the same token, life can be very unfree in democracies that do see fit to meddle in daily life and commerce. To the individual, it does not matter if the stae is democratic or despotic, the effect of the use of state power against him is the same.
Joe
Joe, I'm not sure I agree. Wealth is a relative term in and of itself. A man with decent cloths, a roof that does not leak, and three squares would be considered quite wealthy in most places in the world, then and now. Diamond is not, however, directly concerned on this level.
Still reading "Collapse" and I'll be interested in his conclusions.
Bill Kambic
Mangalarga Marchador: Uma raça, uma paixão
Still reading "Collapse" and I'll be interested in his conclusions.
Bill Kambic
Mangalarga Marchador: Uma raça, uma paixão
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Pat Holscher
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On Spain, it's been sometimes claimed that its wealth was a false one. The comparison that is made, typically, is that England was poor, and Spain was rich, and yet England resisted and ultimately triumphed over Spain.
However, some claim that Spain riches were nearly entirely based on a concept that gold equals riches. So much of its early colonial endeavors were based on extraction. That itself is expensive, and caused to to invest in an extremely long transportation chain to service the extraction. That in and of itself was very vulnerable both to weather and piracy, with the latter turning into an English cottage industry.
Early English colonialism wasn't based on Utopia either, but it was different. It tended to have an agricultural base to support it, and be much less extractive. To the extent it was extractive, it was usually of a different nature. So a colony might be growing tea, or exporting lumber, but it was creating a base to do it.
All this is significant, in looking at wealth and decline, in that the Spanish wealth really wasn't very real. It was based on the idea that gold is nifty. People still think gold is nifty, and it has become useful over time, but in those days its value was mostly based on it being shiny, and there not being much of it. Pretty fictional, really. English wealth was based on stuff you could use, and which, in the New World, relied upon the participation of a Middle Class.
That's the real reason that people so often note that Spain's early colonies were often somewhat heavy handed. Average people do not take up mining if they have another option, or unless the pay is great. For Spanish mining, the pay was not great, and nobody was going to emmigrate to the New World to work in a mine. Lots of people, however, were willing to emmigrate to try to get a farm, and lots did, in the British (and French) colonies. With them came merchants, and mechanics, and others.
So real wealth, in that sense, is based not only on what is of value, and what nature can provide, but actual utility, and distribution of that wealth to the populace. Spain couldn't eat all that gold, and the people mining couldn't either. The wealth wasn't real.
Pat
However, some claim that Spain riches were nearly entirely based on a concept that gold equals riches. So much of its early colonial endeavors were based on extraction. That itself is expensive, and caused to to invest in an extremely long transportation chain to service the extraction. That in and of itself was very vulnerable both to weather and piracy, with the latter turning into an English cottage industry.
Early English colonialism wasn't based on Utopia either, but it was different. It tended to have an agricultural base to support it, and be much less extractive. To the extent it was extractive, it was usually of a different nature. So a colony might be growing tea, or exporting lumber, but it was creating a base to do it.
All this is significant, in looking at wealth and decline, in that the Spanish wealth really wasn't very real. It was based on the idea that gold is nifty. People still think gold is nifty, and it has become useful over time, but in those days its value was mostly based on it being shiny, and there not being much of it. Pretty fictional, really. English wealth was based on stuff you could use, and which, in the New World, relied upon the participation of a Middle Class.
That's the real reason that people so often note that Spain's early colonies were often somewhat heavy handed. Average people do not take up mining if they have another option, or unless the pay is great. For Spanish mining, the pay was not great, and nobody was going to emmigrate to the New World to work in a mine. Lots of people, however, were willing to emmigrate to try to get a farm, and lots did, in the British (and French) colonies. With them came merchants, and mechanics, and others.
So real wealth, in that sense, is based not only on what is of value, and what nature can provide, but actual utility, and distribution of that wealth to the populace. Spain couldn't eat all that gold, and the people mining couldn't either. The wealth wasn't real.
Pat
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Pat Holscher
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<blockquote id="quote"><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Joseph Sullivan</i>
<br />As to Germany, you have to ask what constitutes national wealth. The German peoples (for as you said, there were many) were not especially wealthy. That and Frederick's wars is the reason for our huge population of people of German descent.
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></font id="quote"></blockquote id="quote">
That's quite true. Also, the failure of the reforms of the 1840s, and the Kuturkampf, inspired quite a bit of migration. It's been argued that this accelerated the Prussianization of Germany, and removed the moderating influences souther Germans might have had.
I think this might help demonstrate the mixed nature of this topic. As Bill earlier said, it's a nature vs. nuture type of debate, and I don't think there's a clear answer. Some intersting examples of clutures can be given that rose up inspite of an immediately apparent source of resources (although you usually can find substantial ones on a second look), and you can certainly find some examples of countries that ought to have been rich, but weren't, and didn't become influential in spite of great natural resources. But it's hard to argue that natural resources have no influence, and it's easy to overlook their impact.
I tend to think, therefore, that both arguments are right.
On European poverty, northern Europe actually had some pretty distressed populations well into the 20th Century, but finding a single cause would be tough to find. The German one is given here already, as well as the causes for it. The Scandinavian populations were desperately poor well into the early 20th Century, but certainly can't be argued to have been politically repressed in any substantial way. The Finns were also very poor, and contiued to be after indepenadance from Russia. Ireland, of course, was poor up until quite recently, which can't be entirelyi attributed to the UK, as some like to do. The Scots, likewise, have been poor, but were largely rendered poor by a shift of their landlords from crop production to sheep.
Pat
<br />As to Germany, you have to ask what constitutes national wealth. The German peoples (for as you said, there were many) were not especially wealthy. That and Frederick's wars is the reason for our huge population of people of German descent.
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></font id="quote"></blockquote id="quote">
That's quite true. Also, the failure of the reforms of the 1840s, and the Kuturkampf, inspired quite a bit of migration. It's been argued that this accelerated the Prussianization of Germany, and removed the moderating influences souther Germans might have had.
I think this might help demonstrate the mixed nature of this topic. As Bill earlier said, it's a nature vs. nuture type of debate, and I don't think there's a clear answer. Some intersting examples of clutures can be given that rose up inspite of an immediately apparent source of resources (although you usually can find substantial ones on a second look), and you can certainly find some examples of countries that ought to have been rich, but weren't, and didn't become influential in spite of great natural resources. But it's hard to argue that natural resources have no influence, and it's easy to overlook their impact.
I tend to think, therefore, that both arguments are right.
On European poverty, northern Europe actually had some pretty distressed populations well into the 20th Century, but finding a single cause would be tough to find. The German one is given here already, as well as the causes for it. The Scandinavian populations were desperately poor well into the early 20th Century, but certainly can't be argued to have been politically repressed in any substantial way. The Finns were also very poor, and contiued to be after indepenadance from Russia. Ireland, of course, was poor up until quite recently, which can't be entirelyi attributed to the UK, as some like to do. The Scots, likewise, have been poor, but were largely rendered poor by a shift of their landlords from crop production to sheep.
Pat
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Joseph Sullivan
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Pat:
You have restated, quite nicely, the premise of THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, Adam Smith's book that became the foundation of classical economics. That is really what I was alluding to above in my comments about how national wealth is measured.
Bill, or Diamond, cannot have it both ways. Either wealth is a wholly relative concept, or it is an objective one. An serious argument cannot be made that people are more or less wealthy under a given set of circumstances, unless there is some empirical basis for the comparison. Yet Diamond makes such a comparison, according to Bill. Therefore, if Diamond's work is to be taken seriously, there must be an empirical basis to the claims. If that is the platform on which his thesis rests, we must examine his premises and definitions. As I see it there are three major issues to be examined: a) what is the wealth of nations and how is it measured; b) what is freedom, and how can it be measured or assessed; and finally, c) what is culture (as in the predominant modes of thought and action, NOT as in the arts).
Bill Kambic, the floor is yours.
Joe
You have restated, quite nicely, the premise of THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, Adam Smith's book that became the foundation of classical economics. That is really what I was alluding to above in my comments about how national wealth is measured.
Bill, or Diamond, cannot have it both ways. Either wealth is a wholly relative concept, or it is an objective one. An serious argument cannot be made that people are more or less wealthy under a given set of circumstances, unless there is some empirical basis for the comparison. Yet Diamond makes such a comparison, according to Bill. Therefore, if Diamond's work is to be taken seriously, there must be an empirical basis to the claims. If that is the platform on which his thesis rests, we must examine his premises and definitions. As I see it there are three major issues to be examined: a) what is the wealth of nations and how is it measured; b) what is freedom, and how can it be measured or assessed; and finally, c) what is culture (as in the predominant modes of thought and action, NOT as in the arts).
Bill Kambic, the floor is yours.
Joe
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FtValleyPS
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Bill, I read the book (GG&S), and agree with your analysis and assessments above - good job/review.
Joe, Pat ... my thoughts are that this discussion may actually be too "deep" at points for ultimately correct or definable conclusions, that each and every work or discussion on such a scale is going to be, by definition, fraught with frailties, if you will, including with scholarly studies and the sentences above in this thread. And so we accept these differences and seek cogent and desirable theories and advantages, is my thought.
I believe questions a), b), and c) above could be asked and answered for any society or species and at any level of their development, and in the end, if you don't have a quality environment, by either definition, you have nothing, and living in a tent with rudimentary food and water might make you feel rich.
Seems to me the cogent part of this is not so much how you feel about some of these things, including the right to gain material wealth, but more about how you take care of the planet.
Joe, Pat ... my thoughts are that this discussion may actually be too "deep" at points for ultimately correct or definable conclusions, that each and every work or discussion on such a scale is going to be, by definition, fraught with frailties, if you will, including with scholarly studies and the sentences above in this thread. And so we accept these differences and seek cogent and desirable theories and advantages, is my thought.
I believe questions a), b), and c) above could be asked and answered for any society or species and at any level of their development, and in the end, if you don't have a quality environment, by either definition, you have nothing, and living in a tent with rudimentary food and water might make you feel rich.
Seems to me the cogent part of this is not so much how you feel about some of these things, including the right to gain material wealth, but more about how you take care of the planet.
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Joseph Sullivan
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Hmmm.
Well, John, your point that questions a, b, and c could be asked for any society is of course, indisputable. In fact, those questions have been asked, and explored if not answered, in great detail, on a universal basis. They are at the essence of human freedom and prosperity, and get to the essence of how societies succeed or fail.
Your remarks introduce an unrelated topic. It is, nonetheless very important. Your comments were brief and I hope not to read too much into them, but surely you do not mean your comment, "Seems to me the cogent part of this is not so much how you feel about some of these things, including the right to gain material wealth, but more about how you take care of the planet." to be taken literally?
Without pushing things too far: 1)would you prefer to be unfree in a clean place, or the be free in a somewhat compromised one; 2) aren't you disregarding the fact that the right to material gain and the more prosperous societies that have developed ewhere those rights exist are, empirically, claener and have a more developed public consciousness of environmental matters (and can afford the luxury of worrying about such things)?
Joe
Well, John, your point that questions a, b, and c could be asked for any society is of course, indisputable. In fact, those questions have been asked, and explored if not answered, in great detail, on a universal basis. They are at the essence of human freedom and prosperity, and get to the essence of how societies succeed or fail.
Your remarks introduce an unrelated topic. It is, nonetheless very important. Your comments were brief and I hope not to read too much into them, but surely you do not mean your comment, "Seems to me the cogent part of this is not so much how you feel about some of these things, including the right to gain material wealth, but more about how you take care of the planet." to be taken literally?
Without pushing things too far: 1)would you prefer to be unfree in a clean place, or the be free in a somewhat compromised one; 2) aren't you disregarding the fact that the right to material gain and the more prosperous societies that have developed ewhere those rights exist are, empirically, claener and have a more developed public consciousness of environmental matters (and can afford the luxury of worrying about such things)?
Joe