dimarcol wrote:
BTW... there was no significant use of horse cavalry by the insurgents, though I have read of both French and insurgents using horses on occasion as a means of transport ... just to touch base with the original topic
I've seen that as well. That is, I've seen references to horses and mules being used for transport, including one instance in which the Algerian political leadership traveled a very long distance by mule, but no formal cavalry use. It seems to me that I may have seen slight, obscure, reference to some use of mounted men by the French, but in an ad hoc mounted infantry role. I think I might have posted something on that a long while back, and will bump it up when I get a chance.
One thing that the author of A Savage War of Peace states is that DeGaulle came to oppose the ongoing war in Algeria because he felt it was such a primitive war that it held back the modernization of the French Army. It's a really odd area of inquiry, but there may be something to the idea that this was his view. DeGaulle wanted to build a fully modern Army, but in order to do that, he had to have a theater of deployment in mind for that to make sense. He thought that, if France could do that, it would regain prestige in the world. So he wanted jet fighters, atomic weapons, and armor. None of that, however, was of any use in Algeria. The French did deploy some armor, but it was largely ineffective against a guerrilla army. And the French air force found that WWII vintage U.S. bombers were of more utility in Algeria than jets.
There were other things he had in mind too, of course, including the fact that the French had wasted political opportunities in the 1920 to 1950 time frame that would have allowed it to more fully integrate Algeria and satisfy Algerian desires, for which there was no going back. But the army element of it is really odd. There's lots of example of army's suffering as they were built for a different war than they were fighting, but the Algerian War provides, in DeGaulle's period, of an army partially loosing a war because the political leadership of its nation wanted to build to fight a different type of war, and the ongoing war didn't fit the bill.