The Library of Congress and the University of Texas have put these on line. These URLs are to their sites. Great photos. The main menu would be at the American Memory site for the Library of Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amhome.html, with the collection data a http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/award97/txu ... yhome.html and attribution at: The Robert Runyon Photograph Collection, [image number, e.g., 00199], courtesy of The Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin..
Caranzas men, 1913:
http://runyon.lib.utexas.edu/r/RUN00000 ... N00045.JPG
Mexican Cavalry, the Mexican Revolution 1914 (but which side?):
http://runyon.lib.utexas.edu/r/RUN00000 ... N00023.JPG
A very different looking Mexican Cavalry unit:
http://runyon.lib.utexas.edu/r/RUN00000 ... N00013.JPG
Rurales?:
http://runyon.lib.utexas.edu/r/RUN00000 ... N00011.JPG
Mounted Mexican Column, whose troops?:
http://runyon.lib.utexas.edu/r/RUN00000 ... N00007.JPG
A mix of old and new:
http://runyon.lib.utexas.edu/r/RUN00000 ... N00061.JPG
Pat
Cavalry Action In the Mexican Revolution
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Pat Holscher
- Society Member
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- Joined: Thu Nov 30, 2000 6:51 pm
- Last Name: Holscher
Was reading Eisenhower's "Intervention" the other day and was struck by how the Mexican Revolution changed in character at the battle of Celaya. Villa had always relied upon his cavalry for his success, but Obergon, who had just studied developments in Europe in WWI, and who had consulted with German advisors, used trenches and obstacles in the war for the first time. Villa was unable to adjut or overcome it.
Interesting how conditions somewhat repeated themselves, although cavalry remained viable, if not decisive, in Mexico.
Pat
Interesting how conditions somewhat repeated themselves, although cavalry remained viable, if not decisive, in Mexico.
Pat
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Pat Holscher
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Given the recent topic on photos of the Mexican Revolution, I thought this might be worth a second look.
Pat
Pat
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Kevin Fox Φ
Dear Pat,
Thank you very much for reposting this set of very interesting links. The photos are most instructive!
Kevin +
Thank you very much for reposting this set of very interesting links. The photos are most instructive!
Kevin +
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Kevin Fox Φ
Dear Pat,
The final picture, "The Old and the New," seems to illustrate nicely one of the points you made in another of the related threads on the Punitive Expedition. Looking through the eye of hindsight, many historians and commentators have seen the Mexican Civil War and the Punitive Expedition as a time in the history of warfare where horse-mounted cavalry was, essentially, coming to the end of its usefulness. You stated, if I remember you aright, that the actual record of the fighting and the operations as a whole did not support such a conclusion. I very much believe that you are correct.
The cavalry units covered incredible distances in rugged northern Mexico, in truly horrific terrain, as we all know. The truck transport and air scouting, in their early stage of development, suffered far more from terrain, weather, primitive technology, and just plain not "knowing how to do it" difficulties. The unbiased observor, in 1917, would not (or should not) have been been either quick or definitive in stating that the horse was finished and that the motor was the clear wave of the future. Indeed, the cavalry had, in my view at least, added to their laurels, while their were big questions about the newer units and their technologies. We know, from our vantage point that they would overcome their difficulties; in 1916-1917, the sharp upward curve of their capability was hardly so certain.
Here is an analogy. I was a young man when Americans landed on the moon. Like many others, I expected a very different development of our space travel and exploration capacities. Perhaps we were all naive, but I think we expected travel to other planets in the solar system fairly soon and, as a whole, a much greater "normalization" of space travel than we have actually seen. We expected the technology to open up much faster than it has - whether we were right or wrong so to expect. Instead, we have somewhat - not completely, of course - "plateaued" technologically in space. Why that may be is not my point.
My point is that, in 1916-1917, such a plateau of technological progress might well have overtaken motorized warfare - or, more correctly, persons might have wished to allow, at least, for that possibility. After all, the great German army of 1939-1940 was, in so many ways, an horse-drawn army. We have a myth of the Panzer. Perhaps it would be helpful to avoid a "sunset myth" about the cavalry who crossed the Rio Bravo del Norte to fight with great skill, distinction, and effect.
In many ways, this false, retrospective comparison (between "old" cavalry and "new" mechanization) that has been set up is terribly unfair - to the forces of mechanization! Those forces were in a very primitive stage of development. Not so the mounted cavalry!
As I read the works on horse & mule packing, horsemastership, riding techniques truly useful in the field, works on how to operate effectively in the field with large, mounted units, and on all other related "cavalry" subjects, I am really struck by how "perfected" the cavalry service was in the period - say - 1905-1920. I am not saying that it was "perfect," but I am saying that the long experience of the Indian Wars campaigns and then the different experiences of Puerto Rico, of the relief of the legations at Peking, and of the hard campaigning in the Philippines had really brought the cavalry to a high pitch of efficiency. They were at a peak; the motorized units were still very much in their infancy.
The beginning of the twentieth century was also a very volatile time in the theory of cavalry warfare, as well. The lessons of the South African War and of the Russo-Japanese War had led to a great deal of pontificating, particularly in Europe, about how cavalry would be properly employed in the next "real" war. We all know about the revival of the arme blanche, the "Lance Lobby," and so on. Some of that was very unhelpful. The U.S. Cavalry would not have fared well in Mexico if it had "unlearned" the lessons of many decades of Indian campaigning. Yet, the retraining of the Cavalry after 1890-1891 (following the conclusion of the Ghost Dance-related conflicts) to operate in larger units - as it had not really operated since the War Between the States in 1865 - was certainly useful, even if only from the large logistical point of view.
The combination of skills in both the "small war" style of the Indian campaigns and in larger scale mounted warfare (on which the Europeans focused with near exclusivity), as well as recent, real, and hard experience in both, had really honed the U.S. Cavalry. I see them as very much at one of their true peaks in the Punitive Expedition period.
The photo of the two stopped cars, in what was probably the best kept section of roadway in many miles, simply confirms that their time - for many reasons - had not yet come. The cavalry was, by contrast, at an apogee. Only with a hindsight that is not fair to what those of that day then actually experienced and did can the cavalry's campaigning be seen as a sort of "Indian Summer."
Thanks again and Godspeed!
Kevin +
The final picture, "The Old and the New," seems to illustrate nicely one of the points you made in another of the related threads on the Punitive Expedition. Looking through the eye of hindsight, many historians and commentators have seen the Mexican Civil War and the Punitive Expedition as a time in the history of warfare where horse-mounted cavalry was, essentially, coming to the end of its usefulness. You stated, if I remember you aright, that the actual record of the fighting and the operations as a whole did not support such a conclusion. I very much believe that you are correct.
The cavalry units covered incredible distances in rugged northern Mexico, in truly horrific terrain, as we all know. The truck transport and air scouting, in their early stage of development, suffered far more from terrain, weather, primitive technology, and just plain not "knowing how to do it" difficulties. The unbiased observor, in 1917, would not (or should not) have been been either quick or definitive in stating that the horse was finished and that the motor was the clear wave of the future. Indeed, the cavalry had, in my view at least, added to their laurels, while their were big questions about the newer units and their technologies. We know, from our vantage point that they would overcome their difficulties; in 1916-1917, the sharp upward curve of their capability was hardly so certain.
Here is an analogy. I was a young man when Americans landed on the moon. Like many others, I expected a very different development of our space travel and exploration capacities. Perhaps we were all naive, but I think we expected travel to other planets in the solar system fairly soon and, as a whole, a much greater "normalization" of space travel than we have actually seen. We expected the technology to open up much faster than it has - whether we were right or wrong so to expect. Instead, we have somewhat - not completely, of course - "plateaued" technologically in space. Why that may be is not my point.
My point is that, in 1916-1917, such a plateau of technological progress might well have overtaken motorized warfare - or, more correctly, persons might have wished to allow, at least, for that possibility. After all, the great German army of 1939-1940 was, in so many ways, an horse-drawn army. We have a myth of the Panzer. Perhaps it would be helpful to avoid a "sunset myth" about the cavalry who crossed the Rio Bravo del Norte to fight with great skill, distinction, and effect.
In many ways, this false, retrospective comparison (between "old" cavalry and "new" mechanization) that has been set up is terribly unfair - to the forces of mechanization! Those forces were in a very primitive stage of development. Not so the mounted cavalry!
As I read the works on horse & mule packing, horsemastership, riding techniques truly useful in the field, works on how to operate effectively in the field with large, mounted units, and on all other related "cavalry" subjects, I am really struck by how "perfected" the cavalry service was in the period - say - 1905-1920. I am not saying that it was "perfect," but I am saying that the long experience of the Indian Wars campaigns and then the different experiences of Puerto Rico, of the relief of the legations at Peking, and of the hard campaigning in the Philippines had really brought the cavalry to a high pitch of efficiency. They were at a peak; the motorized units were still very much in their infancy.
The beginning of the twentieth century was also a very volatile time in the theory of cavalry warfare, as well. The lessons of the South African War and of the Russo-Japanese War had led to a great deal of pontificating, particularly in Europe, about how cavalry would be properly employed in the next "real" war. We all know about the revival of the arme blanche, the "Lance Lobby," and so on. Some of that was very unhelpful. The U.S. Cavalry would not have fared well in Mexico if it had "unlearned" the lessons of many decades of Indian campaigning. Yet, the retraining of the Cavalry after 1890-1891 (following the conclusion of the Ghost Dance-related conflicts) to operate in larger units - as it had not really operated since the War Between the States in 1865 - was certainly useful, even if only from the large logistical point of view.
The combination of skills in both the "small war" style of the Indian campaigns and in larger scale mounted warfare (on which the Europeans focused with near exclusivity), as well as recent, real, and hard experience in both, had really honed the U.S. Cavalry. I see them as very much at one of their true peaks in the Punitive Expedition period.
The photo of the two stopped cars, in what was probably the best kept section of roadway in many miles, simply confirms that their time - for many reasons - had not yet come. The cavalry was, by contrast, at an apogee. Only with a hindsight that is not fair to what those of that day then actually experienced and did can the cavalry's campaigning be seen as a sort of "Indian Summer."
Thanks again and Godspeed!
Kevin +
-
Joseph Sullivan
- Society Member
- Posts: 858
- Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2000 8:35 pm
- Last Name: Sullivan
KEvin:
What a pleasure to have you back posting at apparent full strength again. I hope you are feeling well or at least better.
Agree completely with your conclusions.
As to motor and air technology, specifically with the aeroscouts, in the accounts of the PE, there are frequent references to troops in the field seeing the planes come over, and then crash nearby. There was a point after which there was no longer any aero service, because all the planes had crashed and were beyond repair.
And to your point about the honed and highly perfected condition of the cavalry -- by the between-the-wars period they had the benefit of everything you listed, plus significant advances in horsemanship (the development of what we variously call the Ft. Riley seat, Military Seat, Balanced Seat, and related skills).
Joe
What a pleasure to have you back posting at apparent full strength again. I hope you are feeling well or at least better.
Agree completely with your conclusions.
As to motor and air technology, specifically with the aeroscouts, in the accounts of the PE, there are frequent references to troops in the field seeing the planes come over, and then crash nearby. There was a point after which there was no longer any aero service, because all the planes had crashed and were beyond repair.
And to your point about the honed and highly perfected condition of the cavalry -- by the between-the-wars period they had the benefit of everything you listed, plus significant advances in horsemanship (the development of what we variously call the Ft. Riley seat, Military Seat, Balanced Seat, and related skills).
Joe
-
Pat Holscher
- Society Member
- Posts: 7553
- Joined: Thu Nov 30, 2000 6:51 pm
- Last Name: Holscher
Kevin, like Joe, I'd note that it's good to see you back!Originally posted by Kevin Fox
Dear Pat,
The final picture, "The Old and the New," seems to illustrate nicely one of the points you made in another of the related threads on the Punitive Expedition. Looking through the eye of hindsight, many historians and commentators have seen the Mexican Civil War and the Punitive Expedition as a time in the history of warfare where horse-mounted cavalry was, essentially, coming to the end of its usefulness. You stated, if I remember you aright, that the actual record of the fighting and the operations as a whole did not support such a conclusion. I very much believe that you are correct.
The cavalry units covered incredible distances in rugged northern Mexico, in truly horrific terrain, as we all know. The truck transport and air scouting, in their early stage of development, suffered far more from terrain, weather, primitive technology, and just plain not "knowing how to do it" difficulties. The unbiased observor, in 1917, would not (or should not) have been been either quick or definitive in stating that the horse was finished and that the motor was the clear wave of the future. Indeed, the cavalry had, in my view at least, added to their laurels, while their were big questions about the newer units and their technologies. We know, from our vantage point that they would overcome their difficulties; in 1916-1917, the sharp upward curve of their capability was hardly so certain.
Here is an analogy. I was a young man when Americans landed on the moon. Like many others, I expected a very different development of our space travel and exploration capacities. Perhaps we were all naive, but I think we expected travel to other planets in the solar system fairly soon and, as a whole, a much greater "normalization" of space travel than we have actually seen. We expected the technology to open up much faster than it has - whether we were right or wrong so to expect. Instead, we have somewhat - not completely, of course - "plateaued" technologically in space. Why that may be is not my point.
My point is that, in 1916-1917, such a plateau of technological progress might well have overtaken motorized warfare - or, more correctly, persons might have wished to allow, at least, for that possibility. After all, the great German army of 1939-1940 was, in so many ways, an horse-drawn army. We have a myth of the Panzer. Perhaps it would be helpful to avoid a "sunset myth" about the cavalry who crossed the Rio Bravo del Norte to fight with great skill, distinction, and effect.
In many ways, this false, retrospective comparison (between "old" cavalry and "new" mechanization) that has been set up is terribly unfair - to the forces of mechanization! Those forces were in a very primitive stage of development. Not so the mounted cavalry!
As I read the works on horse & mule packing, horsemastership, riding techniques truly useful in the field, works on how to operate effectively in the field with large, mounted units, and on all other related "cavalry" subjects, I am really struck by how "perfected" the cavalry service was in the period - say - 1905-1920. I am not saying that it was "perfect," but I am saying that the long experience of the Indian Wars campaigns and then the different experiences of Puerto Rico, of the relief of the legations at Peking, and of the hard campaigning in the Philippines had really brought the cavalry to a high pitch of efficiency. They were at a peak; the motorized units were still very much in their infancy.
The beginning of the twentieth century was also a very volatile time in the theory of cavalry warfare, as well. The lessons of the South African War and of the Russo-Japanese War had led to a great deal of pontificating, particularly in Europe, about how cavalry would be properly employed in the next "real" war. We all know about the revival of the arme blanche, the "Lance Lobby," and so on. Some of that was very unhelpful. The U.S. Cavalry would not have fared well in Mexico if it had "unlearned" the lessons of many decades of Indian campaigning. Yet, the retraining of the Cavalry after 1890-1891 (following the conclusion of the Ghost Dance-related conflicts) to operate in larger units - as it had not really operated since the War Between the States in 1865 - was certainly useful, even if only from the large logistical point of view.
The combination of skills in both the "small war" style of the Indian campaigns and in larger scale mounted warfare (on which the Europeans focused with near exclusivity), as well as recent, real, and hard experience in both, had really honed the U.S. Cavalry. I see them as very much at one of their true peaks in the Punitive Expedition period.
The photo of the two stopped cars, in what was probably the best kept section of roadway in many miles, simply confirms that their time - for many reasons - had not yet come. The cavalry was, by contrast, at an apogee. Only with a hindsight that is not fair to what those of that day then actually experienced and did can the cavalry's campaigning be seen as a sort of "Indian Summer."
Thanks again and Godspeed!
Kevin +
You raise very interesting point, which I naturally agree with. Indeed, if the totality of cavalry operations after 1860, and up until 1930, or so, is all taken together, and if a person doesn't consider the mechanzied era that came in the 1940s, what we see is that the new internal combustion engine, rather than replacing the horse, allowed cavalry to move to its fullest in arid regions. Before that, while cavalry was always an important arm in these areas, it was hampered by the problem of logistics. After that, it's logistical situation was greatly improved. So really the early introduction of engines not only did not replace the horse, but increased the mobility of cavalry.
Joe raises a very interesting point about aircraft. I've heard aircraft cited so often as a new factor in the Punitive Expedition that I pretty much accepted that this experiment was successful, if qualified.Originally posted by Joseph Sullivan
KEvin:
What a pleasure to have you back posting at apparent full strength again. I hope you are feeling well or at least better.
Agree completely with your conclusions.
As to motor and air technology, specifically with the aeroscouts, in the accounts of the PE, there are frequent references to troops in the field seeing the planes come over, and then crash nearby. There was a point after which there was no longer any aero service, because all the planes had crashed and were beyond repair.
And to your point about the honed and highly perfected condition of the cavalry -- by the between-the-wars period they had the benefit of everything you listed, plus significant advances in horsemanship (the development of what we variously call the Ft. Riley seat, Military Seat, Balanced Seat, and related skills).
Joe
I was surprised then to read in Eisenhower's book "Intervention" exactly how little use of aircraft there really was. Indeed, I almost wonder if the knowledge of their introduction has lead to the belief that their use in Mexico was broader than it was. I'll have to check to tonight, but I think Eisenhower credited the aircraft folks with only one single successful mission, after which aircraft were withdrawn as they were too dangerous to their users. The aircraft themselves were shipped to their staging area by truck, as their commander realized they would not be able to endure an extended air trip. As it was, the fact that they had trucks to ship the aircraft made the unit valuable, but for the trucks, as opposed to the aircraft. The aircraft CO was in charge of motor transport for awhile, as he was from the only unit that had all motorized ground transport.
With all that, while it may have suggested that the aircraft would become an important military item of some sort, it seems that its future use couldn't have been regarded as imminent, or even as potentially in combat. By analogy, it was sort of like a fragile mobile observation balloon. And even the experiences of WWI, in areas like Arabia, wouldn't really suggest that the aircraft had reached the point of replacing any role occupied by cavalry.
Pat
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Joseph Sullivan
- Society Member
- Posts: 858
- Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2000 8:35 pm
- Last Name: Sullivan
According to Tompkins, there were several attempts to use them as fast couriers (airborn gallopers), and sometimes it more or less worked.
Joe
Joe
Kevin,
Welcome back.
A couple of points to be made; after the American Civil War, the US Army, except of the Coast Artillery, served as a big Sheriff’s Department, both during Reconstruction and the Indian Wars. After that the Army had to learn again to work as large units. The Dick Act of 1903 provided for the closure of numerous one-company posts for consolidation onto larger Brigade Posts. Various branches were required to learn how to work together in and with large units. This paid off handsomely in the Punitive Expedition and WWI.
In addition, the Federal Government picked up part of the tab for supporting the National Guard, no longer the Militia. This provided standardized training and equipment for the Guard in return for Federal service when called.
I am of the opinion that the Punitive Expedition and WWI were successfully conducted by the American troops involved because the Army itself had become more professional. They had learned how to be an Army.
Aircraft were somewhat delicate creatures at that time. When the 1st Aero Squadron left Fort Sill for Columbus, NM, they had to follow railroad tracks as the maps of the period were insufficient to get them there. Additionally, the towns themselves were not marked for identification from the air and consequently many pilots still got lost. When they finally arrived at Columbus the aircraft had four horsepower more than necessary for takeoff at that altitude. All it took was a bad spark plug or a little trash in the gas to make that aircraft a smoking heap of debris. They were still on the low side of the learning curve at this point, but then again, the airplane was only 13 years old at the time. The fact that they were used at all in those primitive conditions is in itself amazing. Pat’s assertion that the trucks of the Aero Squadron contributed more that the aircraft is valid. It served to point out failings in the planning for the campaign and this improved during WWI and later.
Couvi
<i>"Cavalier san Cheval"</i>
Welcome back.
A couple of points to be made; after the American Civil War, the US Army, except of the Coast Artillery, served as a big Sheriff’s Department, both during Reconstruction and the Indian Wars. After that the Army had to learn again to work as large units. The Dick Act of 1903 provided for the closure of numerous one-company posts for consolidation onto larger Brigade Posts. Various branches were required to learn how to work together in and with large units. This paid off handsomely in the Punitive Expedition and WWI.
In addition, the Federal Government picked up part of the tab for supporting the National Guard, no longer the Militia. This provided standardized training and equipment for the Guard in return for Federal service when called.
I am of the opinion that the Punitive Expedition and WWI were successfully conducted by the American troops involved because the Army itself had become more professional. They had learned how to be an Army.
Aircraft were somewhat delicate creatures at that time. When the 1st Aero Squadron left Fort Sill for Columbus, NM, they had to follow railroad tracks as the maps of the period were insufficient to get them there. Additionally, the towns themselves were not marked for identification from the air and consequently many pilots still got lost. When they finally arrived at Columbus the aircraft had four horsepower more than necessary for takeoff at that altitude. All it took was a bad spark plug or a little trash in the gas to make that aircraft a smoking heap of debris. They were still on the low side of the learning curve at this point, but then again, the airplane was only 13 years old at the time. The fact that they were used at all in those primitive conditions is in itself amazing. Pat’s assertion that the trucks of the Aero Squadron contributed more that the aircraft is valid. It served to point out failings in the planning for the campaign and this improved during WWI and later.
Couvi
<i>"Cavalier san Cheval"</i>
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Kevin Fox Φ
Dear Joe & Pat,
Thank you for your kind words. The cancer is extremely serious, but I have responded well to chemotherapy. I have, by the grace of God, only missed two services at St. Luke's since I became ill in June. I am way out beyond medical norms and expectations and into the realm of grace. We shall see what God intends for me in the way of physical healing; I have already received an incredible spiritual healing.
Until mid-November, I was able to ride, even to whip in for my fox-hunt. Over Thanksgiving, I developed blood clots - a typical complication of this cancer. So, I am now on big-time blood thinners and cannot ride, as a fall could cause an internal bleed that might not be stoppable. A pity and a real loss. Maybe I'll be back in the saddle by spring. I have spent the time with study, work, family, and also with research on my projected book on the Winchester Model 1895 rifle.
Some of that touches the Punitive Expedition period that we are now examining here on the Society's forum.
Interestingly, it looks more and more as if some (many? a few?) of the 10,000 Winchester Model 1895 muskets ordered by General Nelson Miles for the Army to use in the War with Spain, but which were ready too late and which were ultimately rejected after 100 were tested in the Philippines, were converted by Army arsenals or regimental armourers to carbine configuration. There are just too many of these carbine conversions that are identical turning up to be the work of individual garage gunsmiths. All these carbines show very hard service. It seems that they were issued to U.S. Cavalry regiments serving along the Rio Grande frontier. Some (a few? a dozen? many?) have markings - there is one reported that says "7th Cavalry" - that would appear, if this can be properly authenticated, to confirm cavalry service. Some of these may have been officers' private purchase weapons, as was documented for San Juan Hill and the Santiago Campaign generally. By whatever chain, some of these Model 1895 carbines, in yet another unknown turn, appear to have come into the hands of Pancho Villa's forces and, finally, in the 1950's, were discovered in Mexico City within a stored cache of old Villista weaponry. Villa's forces liked the Model 1895 carbines a lot, bought their own through more usual channels, always were on the lookout for them, and issued them to crack men. The Model 1895 carbine is also seen a lot in the hands of Texas Rangers in the period we are discussing (1900-1925), and it was the semi-official long arm of the redoubtable Arizona Rangers (1901-1909). There is good photographic evidence for all that. The Model 1895 carbine is, after all, arguably the supreme saddle gun - flat, powerful, reliable, rugged.
So, it is vaguely possible that, during the Punitive Expedition, Pershing's cavalrymen were facing, here and there, former cavalry weapons that the Villistas had "acquired" from American forces in earlier raids (?), thefts (?), or ... who knows how along that tense border. A lot of research still needs to go forward, and, as always, I am looking for leads.
The Punitive Expedition is a fascinating chapter. I hope that increasing research and scholarship will be turned to it. I, too, knew about the dismal "airworthiness" of the aerial scouts, but one has to start somewhere, and our aeronauts did! I'll bet there were some queasy questions when the pilots and observors came down out in the hinterland! A lot depended on who showed up next; so, I hope our cavalrymen were riding hard toward where they saw those planes sputtering down! Now, really, who was helping whom?
It is interesting that, within ten years, largely due to the extreme pace of technological advance under pressure of fighting the air war on the Western Front, the whole picture had completely changed. Whereas Villa got away in 1916-1917 and whereas Lawrence of Arabia was successful with the Revolt in the Desert in roughly the same time frame, by the mid-1920's, French military aviation was absolutely the key factor in Morocco in the surpression of Abd-el-Krim and the Riffs. The desert horseman could, by then, be found and tracked, and the balance began to shift rather dramatically.
Pat, I agree completely that motor transport in this transitional period really did greatly help horse mounted cavalry. The logistical tail was greatly affected, and the cavalry liberated from terrific weight, strain on animals, and consequent limitations of range. Certainly that was the experience of both the Indian and British cavalry units serving in India and along the Northwest Frontier Province in the 1920's and 1930's. I note the terrain similarities - the NWFP, northern Mexico, the Atlas, the Arabian deserts, and the Trans-Jordanian mountains. I think a study of cavalry operations, from 1910-1940, in arid regions might return some very useful dividends. Allenby's cavalry successes in Palestine, particularly the big break-through at Megiddo, are part & parcel of that. Someone who knows more about the bloody Gran Cacho War in the late 1920's-early 1930's might include that region, too. Certainly that conflict saw similar air reconnaissance issues, but with airplanes that had greatly improved capabilities from the days of the Punitive Expedition.
Godspeed!
Kevin +
Thank you for your kind words. The cancer is extremely serious, but I have responded well to chemotherapy. I have, by the grace of God, only missed two services at St. Luke's since I became ill in June. I am way out beyond medical norms and expectations and into the realm of grace. We shall see what God intends for me in the way of physical healing; I have already received an incredible spiritual healing.
Until mid-November, I was able to ride, even to whip in for my fox-hunt. Over Thanksgiving, I developed blood clots - a typical complication of this cancer. So, I am now on big-time blood thinners and cannot ride, as a fall could cause an internal bleed that might not be stoppable. A pity and a real loss. Maybe I'll be back in the saddle by spring. I have spent the time with study, work, family, and also with research on my projected book on the Winchester Model 1895 rifle.
Some of that touches the Punitive Expedition period that we are now examining here on the Society's forum.
Interestingly, it looks more and more as if some (many? a few?) of the 10,000 Winchester Model 1895 muskets ordered by General Nelson Miles for the Army to use in the War with Spain, but which were ready too late and which were ultimately rejected after 100 were tested in the Philippines, were converted by Army arsenals or regimental armourers to carbine configuration. There are just too many of these carbine conversions that are identical turning up to be the work of individual garage gunsmiths. All these carbines show very hard service. It seems that they were issued to U.S. Cavalry regiments serving along the Rio Grande frontier. Some (a few? a dozen? many?) have markings - there is one reported that says "7th Cavalry" - that would appear, if this can be properly authenticated, to confirm cavalry service. Some of these may have been officers' private purchase weapons, as was documented for San Juan Hill and the Santiago Campaign generally. By whatever chain, some of these Model 1895 carbines, in yet another unknown turn, appear to have come into the hands of Pancho Villa's forces and, finally, in the 1950's, were discovered in Mexico City within a stored cache of old Villista weaponry. Villa's forces liked the Model 1895 carbines a lot, bought their own through more usual channels, always were on the lookout for them, and issued them to crack men. The Model 1895 carbine is also seen a lot in the hands of Texas Rangers in the period we are discussing (1900-1925), and it was the semi-official long arm of the redoubtable Arizona Rangers (1901-1909). There is good photographic evidence for all that. The Model 1895 carbine is, after all, arguably the supreme saddle gun - flat, powerful, reliable, rugged.
So, it is vaguely possible that, during the Punitive Expedition, Pershing's cavalrymen were facing, here and there, former cavalry weapons that the Villistas had "acquired" from American forces in earlier raids (?), thefts (?), or ... who knows how along that tense border. A lot of research still needs to go forward, and, as always, I am looking for leads.
The Punitive Expedition is a fascinating chapter. I hope that increasing research and scholarship will be turned to it. I, too, knew about the dismal "airworthiness" of the aerial scouts, but one has to start somewhere, and our aeronauts did! I'll bet there were some queasy questions when the pilots and observors came down out in the hinterland! A lot depended on who showed up next; so, I hope our cavalrymen were riding hard toward where they saw those planes sputtering down! Now, really, who was helping whom?
It is interesting that, within ten years, largely due to the extreme pace of technological advance under pressure of fighting the air war on the Western Front, the whole picture had completely changed. Whereas Villa got away in 1916-1917 and whereas Lawrence of Arabia was successful with the Revolt in the Desert in roughly the same time frame, by the mid-1920's, French military aviation was absolutely the key factor in Morocco in the surpression of Abd-el-Krim and the Riffs. The desert horseman could, by then, be found and tracked, and the balance began to shift rather dramatically.
Pat, I agree completely that motor transport in this transitional period really did greatly help horse mounted cavalry. The logistical tail was greatly affected, and the cavalry liberated from terrific weight, strain on animals, and consequent limitations of range. Certainly that was the experience of both the Indian and British cavalry units serving in India and along the Northwest Frontier Province in the 1920's and 1930's. I note the terrain similarities - the NWFP, northern Mexico, the Atlas, the Arabian deserts, and the Trans-Jordanian mountains. I think a study of cavalry operations, from 1910-1940, in arid regions might return some very useful dividends. Allenby's cavalry successes in Palestine, particularly the big break-through at Megiddo, are part & parcel of that. Someone who knows more about the bloody Gran Cacho War in the late 1920's-early 1930's might include that region, too. Certainly that conflict saw similar air reconnaissance issues, but with airplanes that had greatly improved capabilities from the days of the Punitive Expedition.
Godspeed!
Kevin +
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Kevin Fox Φ
Dear Couvi,
Your very interesting & helpful post crossed mine as I was replying. Thank you for the good observations. I agree entirely that the American army made a successful transition from an essentially ranger-mounted rifle-police force to a true army, that the factors you point out were crucial, and that successes in the Punitive Expedition, World War I, various interwar interventions, and in World War II are directly attributable to that transition.
Godspeed!
Kevin +
Your very interesting & helpful post crossed mine as I was replying. Thank you for the good observations. I agree entirely that the American army made a successful transition from an essentially ranger-mounted rifle-police force to a true army, that the factors you point out were crucial, and that successes in the Punitive Expedition, World War I, various interwar interventions, and in World War II are directly attributable to that transition.
Godspeed!
Kevin +
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Pat Holscher
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Indeed, that is correct, and I'd remembered it incorrectly. There were several instances of their use, some successful, some not. Often the commander of the First Aero Squadron himself would fly the missions, given their risk.Originally posted by Joseph Sullivan
According to Tompkins, there were several attempts to use them as fast couriers (airborn gallopers), and sometimes it more or less worked.
Joe
The aircraft used were pretty primitive, which is not surprising, as Couvi points out. The JN-3s were actually unsuitable for flights over 50 miles, but were used in excess of that. The altitude presented in the Sierra Madres really taxed their capabilities. There were only ten aircraft available for service, and the Army turned down a request for an additional ten early in the expedition.
That the aircraft were primitive should come as no surprise, of course. Critics of the Army have often pointed out that the US Army lacked much in the way of military aircraft, but given as the airplane was only 13 years old nobody could reasonalby expect otherwise. That the Army had any aircraft is more surprising.
As Kevin points out, the pace of development of aircraft could not conceivably been anticipated. Aircraft developed far more rapidly in their first 50 years of existence than their second half century. Development in WWI alone was surprising. At the start of the war all aircraft were very primitive affairs. By war's end they were genuine dog fighters. And, as the WWI list has recently been exploring, at the tail end of the war the RAF actually had plans to carry out long range bombing in Germany, in response to German Zepplin bombing. None of that could have been known when the Jennies took off to patrol for Pershing.
Pat
There is a book called <u>The Tin Lizzie Troop</u> that is based on the Punitive Expedition that is interesting. While it is fiction, it points out a lot of the shortcomings of the Army on the border that required solutions before the entry into WWI. You can only feel sympathy for the protagonist.
Couvi
<i>"Cavalier san Cheval"</i>
Couvi
<i>"Cavalier san Cheval"</i>
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Pat Holscher
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That causes me to recall this panograhic photograph.Originally posted by Kevin Fox
Interestingly, it looks more and more as if some (many? a few?) of the 10,000 Winchester Model 1895 muskets ordered by General Nelson Miles for the Army to use in the War with Spain, but which were ready too late and which were ultimately rejected after 100 were tested in the Philippines, were converted by Army arsenals or regimental armourers to carbine configuration. There are just too many of these carbine conversions that are identical turning up to be the work of individual garage gunsmiths. All these carbines show very hard service. It seems that they were issued to U.S. Cavalry regiments serving along the Rio Grande frontier. Some (a few? a dozen? many?) have markings - there is one reported that says "7th Cavalry" - that would appear, if this can be properly authenticated, to confirm cavalry service. Some of these may have been officers' private purchase weapons, as was documented for San Juan Hill and the Santiago Campaign generally. By whatever chain, some of these Model 1895 carbines, in yet another unknown turn, appear to have come into the hands of Pancho Villa's forces and, finally, in the 1950's, were discovered in Mexico City within a stored cache of old Villista weaponry. Villa's forces liked the Model 1895 carbines a lot, bought their own through more usual channels, always were on the lookout for them, and issued them to crack men. The Model 1895 carbine is also seen a lot in the hands of Texas Rangers in the period we are discussing (1900-1925), and it was the semi-official long arm of the redoubtable Arizona Rangers (1901-1909). There is good photographic evidence for all that. The Model 1895 carbine is, after all, arguably the supreme saddle gun - flat, powerful, reliable, rugged.
So, it is vaguely possible that, during the Punitive Expedition, Pershing's cavalrymen were facing, here and there, former cavalry weapons that the Villistas had "acquired" from American forces in earlier raids (?), thefts (?), or ... who knows how along that tense border. A lot of research still needs to go forward, and, as always, I am looking for leads.
Michingan State Troops
This photo has always been puzzling to me. It's taken in June 1917 and labeled "Michigan State Troops". We've had it up in the thread on panographic photos, The Big Picture. There's some commentary on it there. Note that these troops look as though they might have a lever action in their scabbars, and also appear to be carrying riot sticks.
Looking at panographic photos on the Library of Congress site I ran across this photo again, and note they'd cataloged it as depicting Mounted Police, but I couldn't find any other catalog data that they've put up on that. They are clearly wearing military uniforms, riding McClellan saddle, and otherwise appear to be troops. And they are labeled on the photo as troops. I've started to wonder if they were State Guardsmen, or a similar organization, given as this photo was taken when it was, but is not labeled as a National Guard outfit. Perhaps they had some policing functions in addition to a military one. They do not appear to be, to my eye, civilian mounted police.
Anyway, they may be carrying lever actions here. If so, that sort of supports, in my mind, the notion that they might be a State Guard unit.
Pat
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Camp Little
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Of note is that Glendon Swarthout, author of "They Came to Cordura" is the author of "The Tin Lizzie Troop" and the 70's misfit/animal activist book, "Bless the Beasts and the Children". This one served as inspiration for the song by the Carpenters and a 1972 movie (with Billy Mumy of Lost in Space) as well.
Kevin, all;
Thanks so much for the perspicuous colloquy. I see clearly for the first time a few of the reasons the PE engenders such interest. That is if I'm not making too big a leap by reading into your comments that the PE stands as an example and rare 'proof' of the effectiveness of the full fruition of horse cavalry- before the rapid pace of our century zoomed past it, like what you will- and before wire. It is generally held among us that horsemastership reached it's highest evolution in the first half of the 20th century- it certainly wasn't dying on the vine!-, but I hadn't recognized the value of the PE as 'pudding', so to speak.
It puts me in mind of a thought I had when it first dawned on me how precious, and improbable, that short final era was: What if the internal combustion engine had been invented a mere twenty or thirty years earlier? If the horse had been mustered out in 1890, or 1900. What a loss.
It's hard to imagine that a crucible, like the cavalry was, will ever come to overall horsemanship again. And it's fitting that time and the race of technologies left this lacuna wherein cavalry could come to bequeath to horses (and horsemen) this latest and greatest horsemanship upon which most good riding now rests, or is indebted to in large measure.
I refer to the whole system and lore of training, management, etc that was developed- not just how one sits on a horse, though of course that would come to be a big part of it, especially in terms of legacy.
Now I suppose I should go back and work my way through all those old threads with a view to this understanding. Thanks again.
Slow on the uptake, but yours , Sandy
Thanks so much for the perspicuous colloquy. I see clearly for the first time a few of the reasons the PE engenders such interest. That is if I'm not making too big a leap by reading into your comments that the PE stands as an example and rare 'proof' of the effectiveness of the full fruition of horse cavalry- before the rapid pace of our century zoomed past it, like what you will- and before wire. It is generally held among us that horsemastership reached it's highest evolution in the first half of the 20th century- it certainly wasn't dying on the vine!-, but I hadn't recognized the value of the PE as 'pudding', so to speak.
It puts me in mind of a thought I had when it first dawned on me how precious, and improbable, that short final era was: What if the internal combustion engine had been invented a mere twenty or thirty years earlier? If the horse had been mustered out in 1890, or 1900. What a loss.
It's hard to imagine that a crucible, like the cavalry was, will ever come to overall horsemanship again. And it's fitting that time and the race of technologies left this lacuna wherein cavalry could come to bequeath to horses (and horsemen) this latest and greatest horsemanship upon which most good riding now rests, or is indebted to in large measure.
I refer to the whole system and lore of training, management, etc that was developed- not just how one sits on a horse, though of course that would come to be a big part of it, especially in terms of legacy.
Now I suppose I should go back and work my way through all those old threads with a view to this understanding. Thanks again.
Slow on the uptake, but yours , Sandy
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Pat Holscher
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Indeed, an element of why the Punitive Expedition is so interesting is not because it was the <i>last</i> major cavalry campaign of the US Army, but rather because it was the <i>only</i> major offensive campaign of the modern era. Depending, of course, on how we define modern era.Originally posted by selewis
Kevin, all;
Thanks so much for the perspicuous colloquy. I see clearly for the first time a few of the reasons the PE engenders such interest. That is if I'm not making too big a leap by reading into your comments that the PE stands as an example and rare 'proof' of the effectiveness of the full fruition of horse cavalry- before the rapid pace of our century zoomed past it, like what you will- and before wire. It is generally held among us that horsemastership reached it's highest evolution in the first half of the 20th century- it certainly wasn't dying on the vine!-, but I hadn't recognized the value of the PE as 'pudding', so to speak.
It puts me in mind of a thought I had when it first dawned on me how precious, and improbable, that short final era was: What if the internal combustion engine had been invented a mere twenty or thirty years earlier? If the horse had been mustered out in 1890, or 1900. What a loss.
It's hard to imagine that a crucible, like the cavalry was, will ever come to overall horsemanship again. And it's fitting that time and the race of technologies left this lacuna wherein cavalry could come to bequeath to horses (and horsemen) this latest and greatest horsemanship upon which most good riding now rests, or is indebted to in large measure.
I refer to the whole system and lore of training, management, etc that was developed- not just how one sits on a horse, though of course that would come to be a big part of it, especially in terms of legacy.
Now I suppose I should go back and work my way through all those old threads with a view to this understanding. Thanks again.
Slow on the uptake, but yours , Sandy
Still, the olive clad troopers of that era, armed with bolt action rifles of a type still used by some sportsmen, carrying a sidearm of a type still in use, equipped with light machininguns, supported by trucks (and wagons and rail) for supplies, and living in posts some of us still recognize, and yes, receiving more training than in the past, make them, in some ways, more of our own era than those troopers who came before them. So it's easy to identify the era, if it's also easier to feel a pit of pain at the end of the equine era which we know came, but they did not know was arriving.
Pat
Don't forget that in WWI a great deal of the mechanization was forced upon the Army by the lack of suitable quantities of horses available for purchase in Europe. Motorized vehicles and bicycles were issued <u>in lieu </u>of horses and mules.
Couvi
<i>"Cavalier san Cheval"</i>
Couvi
<i>"Cavalier san Cheval"</i>
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John Fitzgerald
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Does anyone have US casualty figures for the PE ?
John
"A good horse rides best for a good horseman"
John
"A good horse rides best for a good horseman"
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Pat Holscher
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I was looking back through Revolution On The Rio Grande, as I added it to the PE Bibliography, and I note the DH4 is discussed there. This is later than the PE, of course, as the author mentions them being used in 1918-1919. Anyhow, their use as a border patrol aircraft seems to have generated similiar experiences.Originally posted by Joseph Sullivan
As to motor and air technology, specifically with the aeroscouts, in the accounts of the PE, there are frequent references to troops in the field seeing the planes come over, and then crash nearby. There was a point after which there was no longer any aero service, because all the planes had crashed and were beyond repair.
Pat