Valkyrie, 12/28/'08

[Pat Holscher]

Having now had an opportunity to read a bit further in The Rise and Fall, Shrirer notes that Von Rundstedt and Rommel made several very serious efforts to persuade Hitler to enter into peace negotiations in the early June 1944, after the invasion of Normandy. I had completely forgotten this. This involved two face to face meetings with Hitler, in which both generals insisted that the war was lost and needed to be brought to a conclusion.

After the second meeting, Von Rundstedt was relieved, which may be because Keitel had telephoned him about a failed SS four division attack on British positions, in which Keitel asked what should be done (Hitler and those surrounded Hitler retained illusions that the Western Allies would be thrown back into the sea). Von Rundstedt had replied "Make peace you fools", and no doubt Keitel had tattled on him. Rommel, undeterred, wrote Hitler a blunt letter on July 15, which he thereafter declared to be his "last chance" to Hitler. Thereafter, according to Speidel, he was totally committed to the plot, although he was still opposed to killing Hitler.

This all plays into some of the very peculiar luck that Hitler had in regards to these plots (there were quite a few which actually should have worked, but fell apart due to some odd quirk). The invasion of Normandy actually grossly disrupted the plotting inner circle. Apparently Von Stauffenberg had been convinced that no Allied landing would occur until 1945, and that the plotters therefore had the summer of 44 to perfect their plot. The invasion caught him off guard, and he had become the single most significant person in the plot. When the Allies landed at Normandy, some of the plotters felt that they might as well wait for the inevitable Allied victory, and that acting so late might actually simply seal their legacy as plotters, not patriots. Von Stauffenberg held out hope at first that the Western Allies would be defeated in Normandy, which, according to Shrirer, he was hoping for, as it was felt this would make it easier to reach a deal with the Western Allies. I think this demonstrates the remaining German military nature of the plot, as they obviously weren't acting to achieve Allied aims, but their own.

Anyhow, Shrirer states that the plot remained in disarray at this point, as the plotters couldn't decide what to do. Von Stauffenberg was amongst those who were not sure what to do, according to Shrier, in spite of his central role in reviving the plot up until then, as he doubted that the Western Allies would treat with a new German government (and he was correct on that). Tresckow convinced them to go ahead and act, as he felt that they needed to show to the world that there were those who were opposed to Hitler.

On June 17, Rommel was injured when his car was strafed by an Allied fighter. That removed him from command so that he could recuperate. According to Shrirer, this had a significant impact on the plot's failure, as Rommel was such an active commander. Rommel's removal, ironically by the Allies, left a hole they couldn't fill. You do have to wonder what would have occurred had the plotters gone ahead on July 20, and Rommel declared for them. That wouldn't have assured it's success in chief, but likely would have assured it in France. Of course, the net result of that might have been a bit of a German civil war.

[selewis]

To modify my original post: The program aired again the other night and I found that it is actually two hours in length, I had only seen the last half of it when I wrote my comments. The first hour covers the plots- there were many- beginning in the 30's through to the failed July 20 plot and the end of the war. Very interesting show and a welcome portrayal of the best of German culture and moral courage.

[Pat Holscher]

The DVD of the movie is coming out this week. I very rarely buy a movie DVD, but I'm going to go ahead and get this one.

Also, Von Boeslager's (sp?) book is out. I'm going to order that as well.

[Pat Holscher]

Bumped up in light of the anniversary of this historical event.

[george seal]

I saw this movie when it premiered in Chile some time ago. I found it very good. For some reason, critics seem to have an unhealty hatred for Tom Cruise, probably because of his religion. Lots of Germans said the movie was good but cruise was bad. I don't think so. Also Cruise was important to get the movie made, or at least to get it made with such a lavish budget and such great production values. There was some oposition in Germany to Cruise (and I think someone important, a legislator perhaps, mentioned Cruise's scientology as a reason to oppose the filming of the movie). Autorisation to film in some important historical sites was given only on the last minute. I think that included the site of the execution of the ploters.

I think Cruise did a good job. It's also interesting to note Cruise's profile looks very simmilar to Colonel Von Stauffenberg. Look up the movie's entry in Wikipedia and check Stauffenberg's photo next to Cruise, they look like clones. Supposedly Cruise agreed to do the film because he was impressed with the resemblance. One curious thing is that the movie actually had to downplay Stauffenberg's heroism so it did not look like Cruise was triyng to look macho. For example, they ommited the fact that Stauffenberg refused to be given morphine at the hospital to avoid addiction.

As was mentioned, we all knew there was not going to be any happy endding but the movie keeps you tense all 2 hours, so Bryan Singer showed again he's a good director. Singer's shown Nazi themes before in the great Apt Pupil and even in the first X-Men. Singer did not get the marching right in Apt Pupil, but he sure got it right here. He said he will take a break from Nazis for a time.

The casting was both very good, with great supporting roles and also quite surprising. We see very little of Kenneth Branagh
but I really liked Tom Wikinson. Seeing Terence Stamp was a nice surprise. What was really surprising was seeing Eddie Izzard in a serious and tragic role.

The movie appears to be very realistic. One small detail is that they make it appear the plot was actually closer to succeed that what it really was. Hitler recoverde controll swiftly.

One thing that is not mentioned (at least not in lenght) in the movie is that the Allies knew something was going on and did nothing. Not just not help, they could have used the confusion to advance the war effort. Otto Skorceny (the man that rescued Mussoliny) was surprised by this inaction. In the caos he just went to the War Office and took control of things. He just told everybody he was in charge, and kept cool while everybody was in panic. He used the time to cut the red tape and accelerate the delivery of suplies to troops in the field. He also cheked Stauffenberg's office. It had alredy been searched but Skorceny found the copy of plan Valkyrie (nobody had paid any attention to it). He also was surprised to find a board game of the war in Europe with tokens representing armies and dice. So that was what kept busy all the big shots in the War Office, he said!

The other sad fact is that the Allies would not negotiate with a new German goberment. This led many Germans to realice an honorable peace was imposible and abandon the idea of a coup and decided them to fight to the bitter end. War had turned into and end in itself. This is the definition of militarism, war for war's sake, not for a policy end. Just like the war in Asia were negociated peace was imposible as the stated objective was the inconditional surrender of the Japanese Empire.

I thought it was nice the movie centered on the moral problem of breaking the oath of loyalty. People today think nothing of beaking their word. I also liked the fact that the protagonist were shown as having a religion, like real people, not Hollywood politically correct caricatures.

All in all one of my favorite movies about Nazis, right there with Downfall or The Wave.
Too bad it was not really that successfull. It did make good money but got mixed reviews at best. This shows how the Hollywood marketing machine is really a disgrace. Cruise actually got panned for making this film (even by people that said the film was good) and Tarantino gets praised for the obscenity that is Unglorious Bastards.

[Pat Holscher]

I saw this movie when it premiered in Chile some time ago. I found it very good. For some reason, critics seem to have an unhealty hatred for Tom Cruise, probably because of his religion. Lots of Germans said the movie was good but cruise was bad. I don't think so. Also Cruise was important to get the movie made, or at least to get it made with such a lavish budget and such great production values. There was some oposition in Germany to Cruise (and I think someone important, a legislator perhaps, mentioned Cruise's scientology as a reason to oppose the filming of the movie). Autorisation to film in some important historical sites was given only on the last minute. I think that included the site of the execution of the ploters.

I think Cruise did a good job. It's also interesting to note Cruise's profile looks very simmilar to Colonel Von Stauffenberg. Look up the movie's entry in Wikipedia and check Stauffenberg's photo next to Cruise, they look like clones. Supposedly Cruise agreed to do the film because he was impressed with the resemblance. One curious thing is that the movie actually had to downplay Stauffenberg's heroism so it did not look like Cruise was triyng to look macho. For example, they ommited the fact that Stauffenberg refused to be given morphine at the hospital to avoid addiction.

Excellent points.

The German press was, apparently, hostile to Cruise playing the role. Some of the American press was relatively hostile as well, although apparently not to the same degree. At least one member of the Von Stauffenberg family, I believe one of his children, also expressed reservations about Cruise playing the role.

I do think that Cruise's personality may have a lot to do that. He can come across as a bit different. Having said that, he is an actor, and he did a fine role of playing Von Stauffenberg in my view. Indeed, it's interesting to contrast his performance with that in a German television drama (available on tape) from a few years back. All in all, I thought Cruise's performance much closer to what we read of Von Stauffenberg's personality. Perhaps ironically, while done subtly, the Cruise film did a better job of suggesting the religious influence on the July 20 plotters and Von Stauffenberg than the German film did, although neither really come that close to doing it justice.

The casting was both very good, with great supporting roles and also quite surprising. We see very little of Kenneth Branagh
but I really liked Tom Wikinson. Seeing Terence Stamp was a nice surprise. What was really surprising was seeing Eddie Izzard in a serious and tragic role.

I fully agree.

The movie appears to be very realistic. One small detail is that they make it appear the plot was actually closer to succeed that what it really was. Hitler recoverde controll swiftly.

I agree again. Here, the German film did a much better job. The attempted coup did fall apart fairly rapidly, and even though it was quite successful in some locations, overall it did not get as close to success as the film suggests.

One thing that is not mentioned (at least not in lenght) in the movie is that the Allies knew something was going on and did nothing. Not just not help, they could have used the confusion to advance the war effort. Otto Skorceny (the man that rescued Mussoliny) was surprised by this inaction. In the caos he just went to the War Office and took control of things. He just told everybody he was in charge, and kept cool while everybody was in panic. He used the time to cut the red tape and accelerate the delivery of suplies to troops in the field. He also cheked Stauffenberg's office. It had alredy been searched but Skorceny found the copy of plan Valkyrie (nobody had paid any attention to it). He also was surprised to find a board game of the war in Europe with tokens representing armies and dice. So that was what kept busy all the big shots in the War Office, he said!

The Allies did not react, but I'm not sure what they really could have done. Events played out quickly, but intervening was not really a practical possibility. The fact that the plot fell apart inside of a day probably precluded taking advantage of it on the field, and there may have been some reason to fear that if that had been attempted it may have sparked wavering German forces to fall in with the government rather than be seen to be aiding an enemy.

This all may particularly have been so because the July 20 plotters did not envision a successful coup as necessarily ending the war immediately. They seem to have harbored delusions that they could end the war against just the East or the West and carry on against the other. For the most part, most of them seemed to believe that an armistice could be reached in the West and the war against the USSR carried on, perhaps with Allied assistance. Some, however, actually leaned the other way, believing that a peace could be reached with the Soviet Union and the war carried on in West. Von Stauffenberg actually leaned this way, which is something that is rarely mentioned about him, and which clouds the otherwise favorable view of him in the West. Both thoughts were unrealistic, and virtually in the nature of pipe dreams at that point.

The other sad fact is that the Allies would not negotiate with a new German goberment. This led many Germans to realice an honorable peace was imposible and abandon the idea of a coup and decided them to fight to the bitter end. War had turned into and end in itself. This is the definition of militarism, war for war's sake, not for a policy end. Just like the war in Asia were negociated peace was imposible as the stated objective was the inconditional surrender of the Japanese Empire.

Here I disagree. Given the nature of the war, any negotiated peace with Germany had become an impossibility. The honorable course of action in late 1944 would have been for Germany to surrender with the negotiation to be over a peaceful commencement of an inevitable occupation. No other course of action could have ended the war, and that would have saved millions of lives.

While it is revisionist on my part, to a degree, I'm somewhat convinced by the arguments of some historians (one is the history teacher at UC Berkley, whose name I've forgotten, and the other, also forgotten as to name, of the new book on Germany in 1945), that a majority of Germans, including quite a few in the German military, were not as convinced as we might suppose as to the inevitability of a German defeat in late 1944. This might be part of what made the July 20 plotters somewhat unique, although even they were not convinced that the war was completely lost, but only that a two front war was lost. German history provided several distinct examples of German principalities recovering from worse odds than that faced by the Germans in 1944. Prussia, under Frederick the Great, had managed to win in a war with worse odds even when the Russians were just outside of Berlin, and the German states had been numerically inferior in the Franco Prussian War. More importantly, perhaps, the Germans had fought the Allies to a standstill in 1918 (although they would have found that over with in 1919, had the war carried on), and had reason to hope that the Allies would negotiate out an end to the war again. All of these examples break down upon easy examination, but a lot of Germans believed part or all of them. There's at least some reason to believe that it wasn't really until January 1945 that most Germans and a majority of the German officer corps believed that the war was really lost. The Germans in 1945 took more casualties that month than they had in several entire years in the early part of the war, which shows how resolute their resolve remained at that point (notably, the Red Army took 1M casualties in January 1945, and it was after that that Soviet soldiers became notably harsher on German territory)

This doesn't mean that they held out hope in 1944 that the war could be won. Only the most fanatical Nazis believed that. But a complete defeat wasn't acknowledged by all until quite late.

This is even more the case in regards to the war against Imperial Japan. A negotiated peace was simply impossible, as the Japanese leadership itself did not acknowledge the possibility. Even after the atomic bomb was dropped, some sections of the Japanese military were arguing for continued resistance. The author of the new book "Hell To Pay", about the Operation Downfall, the anticipated invasion of Japan, maintains that the Japanese were anticipating 21 million military and civilian casualties, and that they apparently accepted that. With that being the case, there was little choice but to press for unconditional surrender, although that's not actually what Japan was given. Japan was allowed a condition, that being the continued maintenance of an emperor.

I thought it was nice the movie centered on the moral problem of breaking the oath of loyalty. People today think nothing of beaking their word. I also liked the fact that the protagonist were shown as having a religion, like real people, not Hollywood politically correct caricatures.

I quite agree. The moral and religious aspects that lead to the July 20 plot were the motivating factor, not political aspirations.

All in all one of my favorite movies about Nazis, right there with Downfall or The Wave.
Too bad it was not really that successfull. It did make good money but got mixed reviews at best. This shows how the Hollywood marketing machine is really a disgrace. Cruise actually got panned for making this film (even by people that said the film was good) and Tarantino gets praised for the obscenity that is Unglorious Bastards.

I haven't seen Inglorious Bastards and won't. But I agree with your sentiments. It would seem that a real event, motivated by deep seated religious and philosophical views, is too deep for some in the movie critic industry to appreciate, while something that amounts to nothing more than a vulgar cartoon, mysteriously is. Sad state of affairs.

[george seal]

Pat: You presented good points about the possibility of a peace treaty with Germany. Foster Dulles once said he regretted nothing was done to help the anti-Hitler conspirators, but maybe there was little to do. Skorceny certainly overstimated Allied capability on this especific issue. I supose an alternative (that I think several Germans belived in) could be an earlier German capitulation that would leave the entire country in Anglo-American hands, instead of the horrible prospect of ending under Soviet influence. Of course Stalin would have opposed that. Possibly Churchill would have liked that (and he could have insisted again on obtaining more garantees for Poland). Of course this is all just especulation. As we say in Chile, we are all generals AFTER the battle. Pitty nobody has hindsight before thibgs happen.

Are we reallatively sure Japan would have accepted 21 million dead? As horrible as it seems, it's a really good argument in favor of the atomic bomb. 21 million is actually a little over the entire population of Chile and Uruguay combined.

Congratulations on not seeing the last from Tarantino. Wen I got home from the theater I was so angry my wife asked me if I had been in a fight.

[Pat Holscher]

Bumped up due to related topic.