Horse Soldiers by Doug Stanton

[kerry savee]

I bought Horse Soldiers by Doug Stanton a couple of weeks ago but haven't started to read it seriously, yet. The dust cover states "The extraordinary story of a band of U.S. soldiers who rode to victory in Afghanistan." It is a true account of the Special Forces soldiers who secretly entered Afghanistan after 9/11 and fought with the Northern Alliance against the Taliban using horses for transportation. It looks like an interesting read. Has anyone here read it?

[selewis]

http://www.booktv.org/Program/10676/Hor ... istan.aspx

watch interview on-line

[Dave J.]

I'm about half way through it now. It's a really good read.

[kerry savee]

selewis, thanks for the link to CSPAN BookTV. I watch BookTV frequently, I don't know how I missed this.
Dave, thanks for your comments. I've read the prologue and now starting Part One. I'm getting hooked so I will probably finish it by the weekend.

[Ron Smith]

Like Dave I am about half way through the book and it is an interesting read. Good insight to how Ghost Ops of OEF got going........

[Pat Holscher]

Webcast interview of the author:

http://www.pritzkermilitarylibrary.org/ ... deType=swf

I heard the podcast version of this, and it was very interesting. The author related how none of the SF troops involved in the use of horse had prior experience with them. It sounds, to some degree, that their lack of knowledge as to horses may have proven to be a bit of a detriment to them.

Also described is a Northern Alliance assault on the Taliban, including that the Taliban had armor. Stanton relates that the armor proved to be ineffective as the turrets couldn't track the charging horsemen quickly enough.

[Jim Bewley]

I am now about half way through this book, but using CD in the car. The copy I have does not say it is abridged, but there is not much said concerning the SF becoming more comfortable on horseback, did the modify the short stirrups, were they given pointers and such.

I also don't fully understand how the SF spotter on the ground using GPS, directing a bomb with a built in GPS, can miss the target by more then a mile.

Jim

[kerry savee]

Likewise, I don't understand why the pilot wanted the SF spotter's GPS position inside the fortress during the uprising, then dropped a bomb on the spotter!

[Jim Bewley]

Webcast interview of the author:

http://www.pritzkermilitarylibrary.org/ ... deType=swf

I heard the podcast version of this, and it was very interesting. The author related how none of the SF troops involved in the use of horse had prior experience with them. It sounds, to some degree, that their lack of knowledge as to horses may have proven to be a bit of a detriment to them.

Also described is a Northern Alliance assault on the Taliban, including that the Taliban had armor. Stanton relates that the armor proved to be ineffective as the turrets couldn't track the charging horsemen quickly enough.

There were a couple of discriptions in the book showing that the mounted "Cavalry Charge" is still alive and well today.

Jim

[Jim Bewley]

Likewise, I don't understand why the pilot wanted the SF spotter's GPS position inside the fortress during the uprising, then dropped a bomb on the spotter!

You are right. It made me happy that all we had were weapons that you had to actually "point and shoot".

Jim

[Pat Holscher]

What an odd war. Everything from horse and mules, with lots of light infantry action, to stealth drones:

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/ ... el=defense

[Jim Bewley]

What an odd war. Everything from horse and mules, with lots of light infantry action, to stealth drones:

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/ ... el=defense

The book makes it seem as if all this high tech stuff is not what the papers make it out to be. There was a lot of talk, mostly negative, amoung veterans groups when they talked about giving the DFC to a drone pilot.

Jim

[Kentucky Horseman]

While I highly enjoyed the book, I wish the author had not had his comments about Iraq in comparisons with Afghanistan. namely the fact we lost in Iraq due to the fact we have disbanded the Iraq Army as soon as we took over the country, it is in the epilogue. I do understand his point of it made those men angry but I feel we need to give them a fresh start and not a repackaged same old same old. I am a cilivan and I have never served in the military in any way shape or from, so my opinion is just that.

On the same note however, General Patton wanted the Army to have a few regiments of cavalry for mountain warfare. if the Army had listen to him I wonder how they would have been used in Afghanistan.

There was a couple of the Special forces soilders that were ranch kids and love to ride. I remember that from somewhere in the book. but I can't fine it now. But part of me would love to see those guys the first time they climb on board a horse.

[Pat Holscher]

I'm about half way through it now. It's a really good read.

I just started to finally read my copy, and I agree, it's a really good read. I'm very much enjoying it.

[selewis]

Perhaps this was covered in the book, but if not: In a recent discussion with V.D. Hanson and Peter Robinson at Hoover, Professor John Arquilla (Naval Post Graduate School) mentioned in passing that early on the purpose of placing Special Ops Forces on horseback in Afghanistan was to provide easy identification of friend or foe from the air. Four legs good, motorized bad.

[Pat Holscher]

Perhaps this was covered in the book, but if not: In a recent discussion with V.D. Hanson and Peter Robinson at Hoover, Professor John Arquilla (Naval Post Graduate School) mentioned in passing that early on the purpose of placing Special Ops Forces on horseback in Afghanistan was to provide easy identification of friend or foe from the air. Four legs good, motorized bad.

If that's in the book, I haven't run across it yet. But I have been surprised by the extent to which the Taliban was armed with fairly heavy weapons, and also the extent to which, at least so far, they did not seem to have an equine element. The author relates how the Taliban made relatively extensive use of Soviet armor left in Afghanistan, and that the Taliban even used some jet aircraft at one time in their civil war with other Afghan elements. That really surprised me.

I've also been surprised, so far, by the extent to which horses are mentioned in the book. I was aware, of course, of the SF use of them, but I guess I didn't appreciate the extent to which they were used by the Northern Alliance. I knew that they were used, but the use described somewhat recalls the completely mounted armies of antiquity, or perhaps the more recent example of the Boers.

[Pat Holscher]

To add a bit, I really doubt the purpose of mounting the SF troops was to distinguish them from the Taliban. Rather, the Northern Alliance simply lacked a lot of vehicles, and they took advantage of the fact that the Taliban had them by operating in areas where vehicles couldn't go. I don't think there was much other choice but to mount the SF on horses.

Also, at least for the very first SF troops, the horses came as a surprise. They didn't know that they were going to have to ride until the first Afghan group they met mounted up and rode off, leaving them with enough horses to do the same.

Also, I think that idea (aircraft ID) might presume a better level of airborne identification on the part of pilots than actually exists. Aircraft have always had a hard time distinguishing one group from another. I think in modern Western armies ID is sometimes actually electronic.

[selewis]

To add a bit, I really doubt the purpose of mounting the SF troops was to distinguish them from the Taliban. Rather, the Northern Alliance simply lacked a lot of vehicles, and they took advantage of the fact that the Taliban had them by operating in areas where vehicles couldn't go. I don't think there was much other choice but to mount the SF on horses.

Also, at least for the very first SF troops, the horses came as a surprise. They didn't know that they were going to have to ride until the first Afghan group they met mounted up and rode off, leaving them with enough horses to do the same.

Also, I think that idea (aircraft ID) might presume a better level of airborne identification on the part of pilots than actually exists. Aircraft have always had a hard time distinguishing one group from another. I think in modern Western armies ID is sometimes actually electronic.

Dunno, Pat- just passing along a comment that would seem to be from a good source. It was not, however, the theme of the discussion.

[Pat Holscher]

To add a bit, I really doubt the purpose of mounting the SF troops was to distinguish them from the Taliban. Rather, the Northern Alliance simply lacked a lot of vehicles, and they took advantage of the fact that the Taliban had them by operating in areas where vehicles couldn't go. I don't think there was much other choice but to mount the SF on horses.

Also, at least for the very first SF troops, the horses came as a surprise. They didn't know that they were going to have to ride until the first Afghan group they met mounted up and rode off, leaving them with enough horses to do the same.

Also, I think that idea (aircraft ID) might presume a better level of airborne identification on the part of pilots than actually exists. Aircraft have always had a hard time distinguishing one group from another. I think in modern Western armies ID is sometimes actually electronic.

Dunno, Pat- just passing along a comment that would seem to be from a good source. It was not, however, the theme of the discussion.

I think a surprise from the book is the degree of actual mounted action that occurred early on. The book describes two instances of actual mounted charges by Northern Alliance forces that occurred within several days of the SF showing up. The often repeated message that Donald Rumsfield quoted in a press conference where a soldier described advising the Northern Alliance regarding a mounted attack actually immediately followed one of these, and was sent in frustration as his superiors back in Washington wanted to know why nothing was going on.

The point is that, while I like Hanson, that statement simply seems off the mark. The Northern Alliance forces, at least early on, were sort of semi analogous to the Boer forces in the early stages of the Boer War, and went everywhere by horse. Indeed, it almost seems to be the case that they regarded action without horses as foolish, and the descriptions of their actions would seem to support that. They took horrible casualties in mounted charges, but using the ground very effectively they managed to overcome a much better equipped opposition by using tactics that allowed them to cover a lot of ground quickly.

[kerry savee]

Pat, in reading selewis' post, it appears that Professor John Arquilla (Naval Post Graduate School) is the one who made the comment regarding mounting SF on horses so they would be recognized as friendlies from the air, not V.D. Hanson. I don't see it as being far fetched, especially if it was mentioned as one of the considerations and not necessarily the primary consideration.