Notable Passings

[Pat Holscher]

An interesting synopsis by Richard A. Johnson of Robert McNamara's early career during WWII and (primarily) his time at Ford; with insights into his genius, nature, and implications of how he would later handle Defense:

http://www.americanheritage.com/article ... 1_29.shtml

And two other items.

The New York Times looks at a successful McNamara influenced item, the Ford Falcon:

http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07 ... c=wheelsa1

And George F. Will looks at McNamara in a current context:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/co ... tml?sub=AR

[Pat Holscher]

An interesting synopsis by Richard A. Johnson of Robert McNamara's early career during WWII and (primarily) his time at Ford; with insights into his genius, nature, and implications of how he would later handle Defense:

http://www.americanheritage.com/article ... 1_29.shtml

Thanks for linking that in, it was very interesting.

I think what this helps demonstrate is that brilliance at one thing does not translate necessarily into brilliance in everything. That's really easy for people to forget. A smart businessman might very well not be adept at military matters. A brilliant general might be a very poor businessman.

There's certainly contrary examples, to be sure. Atkinson's recent book The Day of Battle gives a little background on some of the officers involved in the campaign in Italy, for example, that are surprising. As we know, Truscott had started off a school teacher. One high ranking U.S. reserve officer in Italy was a practicing lawyer in civilian life. A high ranking New Zealand officer had been a dentist. And many prior examples exist. Pershing had taught school. Wood was a physician, and so on. But, quite often, a person's talents are more narrowly focused. McNamara was an accountant and statistician at heart, and while brilliant, those talents had little to do with global politics and waging war, which is more of an art form.

Again, one thing that, in retrospect, appears as a lost opportunity would have been to use the then senior and retiring WWII generals, most of whom had started off in the pre-war Army, and who were much more realistic about the use of force and its capabilities. Maxwell Taylor, Jim Gavin, Matthew Ridgeway, etc., were all old hands at that point, and they all tended to be quite critical of overly optimistic views on the use of force, while appreciating new technologies, and their limits. I'd bet that if we'd had Secretary of Defense Jim Gavin, we'd have had a smaller, more agile, more ground pounder Army in the 60s, and I'd also bet that Army wouldn't have fought in Vietnam.

[wkambic]

Again, one thing that, in retrospect, appears as a lost opportunity would have been to use the then senior and retiring WWII generals, most of whom had started off in the pre-war Army, and who were much more realistic about the use of force and its capabilities. Maxwell Taylor, Jim Gavin, Matthew Ridgeway, etc., were all old hands at that point, and they all tended to be quite critical of overly optimistic views on the use of force, while appreciating new technologies, and their limits. I'd bet that if we'd had Secretary of Defense Jim Gavin, we'd have had a smaller, more agile, more ground pounder Army in the 60s, and I'd also bet that Army wouldn't have fought in Vietnam.

I agree that there was a missed opportunity on the part of the Kennedy Administration to effectively use the wisdom and experience of many WWII senior officers. Kennedy was a JO (as were many of his advisors) and I wonder if that might not have colored his views. Many in his Administration saw the WWII leaders (particularly men like Curtis LeMay) as "bloodthirsty Neanderthals." If anything there was a real reluctance to use force in the new Administration. This would carry over the next Administration in its prosecution of what can rightly be called "Kennedy's War."

IMO the Kennedy response to the Vietnam situation was driven by politics. He was severely criticized for his handling of the Bay of Pig Invasion (and its aftermath, including the ransom of the invaders). He was somewhat redeemed in the Cuban Missile Crisis, but that was a direct result of the Bay of Pigs fiasco. He was about to engage Goldwater in what was anticipated to be a very "vigorous" presidential contest in '64. He had to "shore up" his national defense credentials. He, and McNamara along with other advisors, picked Vietnam as the place to do it. With aid of 20/20 hindsight it was not the best choice for a bunch of reasons, but that’s where the effort went.

There was also serious “micromanagement” in the prosecution of the conflict during Kennedy’s time, and it got much worse during the Johnson years. McNamara was likely the lynchpin of this policy (although Johnson was a notorious “control freak” in most things).

It’s a mistake, though, to see Vietnam as the center of national policy in those days. The real enemy was the Soviet Union and its allies, including China. Vietnam was, at most, a minor theater in that larger conflict. While the Sino-Soviet Split was a fact, there was still a lot of cooperation if the common enemy, the U.S., could be effectively targeted. Vietnam was an old enemy of China and preferred Soviet aid, but they took what they could where they could get it. With this in mind we must be careful about thinking that a smaller, “more nimble” Army was a realistic possibility. The Red Army was massive and if it tried a European “land grab” we could need to engage it with an equally massive force. And we were still looking over loaded guns at the North Koreans. “Conventional” forces were still, rightly, the focus.

Could we have done some specific COIN training to deal with the specific conditions in Vietnam? Yes, and not doing so was a big mistake. I don’t know if this can be laid at McNamara’s feet. It would have cost a lot of time, money, and the development of special tools. He was very much a “one size fits all” kind of guy (Naval Aviators remember this well from his pushing of the F-111B carrier variant). His handling of the problems with the early model M16s also suggests a “my way or the highway” type of thinking that does not go well with a “small, nimble” mindset. A proper COIN program will be hard pressed to deliver the definable “milestones” that were so dear to his heart. In any event we did not initiate an effective COIN program and paid for it in the end.

[Couvi]

IMO the Kennedy response to the Vietnam situation was driven by politics. He was severely criticized for his handling of the Bay of Pig Invasion (and its aftermath, including the ransom of the invaders). He was somewhat redeemed in the Cuban Missile Crisis, but that was a direct result of the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Bill,

I think you are dead-on with this statement. The consequences of these politics shaped the lives of a generation and changed our country, in some ways for the better, in some ways worse.

[Pat Holscher]

IMO the Kennedy response to the Vietnam situation was driven by politics. He was severely criticized for his handling of the Bay of Pig Invasion (and its aftermath, including the ransom of the invaders). He was somewhat redeemed in the Cuban Missile Crisis, but that was a direct result of the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Bill,

I think you are dead-on with this statement. The consequences of these politics shaped the lives of a generation and changed our country, in some ways for the better, in some ways worse.

I think the point on Cuba is really excellent. I've never really understood why the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bay of Pigs incident are regarded separately. They seem to obviously be part and parcel of each other.

The whole history of our involvement in Vietnam is murky and difficult to understand today, in 2009. The first time the region really seems to have drawn our attention was during WWII, when we rightly regarded Japanese occupation of the area as a bad deal for us. After the war, however, we probably would have been content to ignore the area. Franklin Roosevelt seems to have actually more or less openly opposed the French reoccupying Indochina, but not so much that he was willing to do anything about it. That probably demonstrated a certain degree of naivete on his part about about the communist element of the anti Japanese resistance.

The possibility of going into Vietnam was known well enough by the early 50s that Marines during the Korean War revised a British WWII song to include the line "the next stop is Saigon" in the lyrics, which is really pretty amazing in retrospect. Truman, however, was less than impressed with the French effort. Truman also was the first of several US Presidents to recognize that the French tended to confuse their colonial interests with anti communism, the two not necessarily being the same.

The first real suggestion that we should have any role in Vietnam War came during the French Indochinese War when the French asked the US to use tactical nuclear weapons to prevent Dien Bien Phu from being overrun. The Eisenhower regime actually considered it, but it asked the British government, once again being lead by Churchill, what their opinion was, as the US considered it improper to deploy nuclear weapons without British approval. The British frankly informed the US that they thought most of the French efforts were going down the tubes and it wasn't worth the effort to try to help. So the US quit considering it. We did overfly Dien Bien Phu, however, conducting some aerial reconnaissance in case the decision to go ahead was made.

In terms of counter factuals, you have to wonder how that would have worked out. Dien Bien Phu probably wouldn't have been overrun, and the French might have won the war. But then, the precedent for using tactical nuclear weapons would have been set.

Apparently by the late 50s, Eisenhower had determined that going into Indochina was inevitable, but that Loas would be the place. I think he may have sent Maxwell Taylor to check it out. In the end he determined he shouldn't act as he was near the end of his term.

Kennedy doesn't seem to have been prompted to act there until near the end of his term. Like a lot of other foreign matters, the Kennedy administration seems to have misunderstood a lot about the region he was contemplating. The regime in South Vietnam was not really loosing the war, and not really winning it. It probably was in no great danger of being toppled by the communists, but the war was going to go on for quite a while at a low rate. Long term, the South Vietnamese government probably would have weathered the storm, but it would have been a long, drawn out matter. But American reporters in the area, such as David Halberstrom, didn't view it that way. And at least one odd maverick American adviser didn't either. And it wasn't a democratic regime. It was up front about that, and its leaders took the position that the Vietnamese people had to be lead by a strongman. Americans tend to believe that any people are instinctively democratic, so the Kennedy administration more or less withdrew its support, which made the government weak, and it was toppled. One thing after another happened after that, and we ended up with a large commitment.

Even so, by late war, we'd really won it. But you can't build up a large, modern, mechanized army, and then withdraw its material support. We more or less did that, which doomed the ARVN. The ARVN weathered at least one conventional offensive in the early 70s, but American airpower played a role. That was no longer available in 1975.

[Pat Holscher]

Kennedy was a JO (as were many of his advisors) and I wonder if that might not have colored his views. Many in his Administration saw the WWII leaders (particularly men like Curtis LeMay) as "bloodthirsty Neanderthals."

On LeMay, I recently heard an interview of an author who wrote a biography of him. One fact that the author noted in his interview really struck me.

LeMay had a personal memory of the first time he'd ever seen an airplane. It flew over a boyhood home of his (the family moved around a lot). He'd never seen a plane before. He was amazed and ran, as a small child, quite some distance following it's direction so that he could see it.

The plane was one of the early Wright Flyers.



To think, from the Wright Flyer to the B-52. Pretty amazing.

[Trooper]

My grandfather saw Louis Bleriot ... and the moon landings.
He often remarked that things had changed since he was a lad - as grandpa's often do - but I think his generation (b.1896) saw more change in their lifetimes than any other.

[Pat Holscher]

My grandfather saw Louis Bleriot ... and the moon landings.
He often remarked that things had changed since he was a lad - as grandpa's often do - but I think his generation (b.1896) saw more change in their lifetimes than any other.

I think you're really right.

People like to comment now about the pace of change, but it strikes me as very slow compared to most of the 20th Century.

When my grandfathers were born, most people didn't drive. Long distance transportation was by train. Fields were plowed, for the most part, with horses. They both learned to drive, but it was universally recalled they were terrible drivers, as they'd learned how to do it as adults. Heck, my mother didn't learn to drive until she was in her 30s. My father's father, and my father, took their first trip in an airplane at the same time, on an airplane that they boarded here in Casper. The old airfield isn't even flat, it's visibly sloped. They flew to Denver. I still take a prop plane to Denver, but I'll bet I get their an hour quicker, when I fly.

When my grandparents were born, there would have been no radios in their houses. My parents would recall radios being a major feature of their childhood homes. My mother's father would complain about my mother's mother listening to opera on the radio, but she'd been trained as a musician and that's what she listened to. I can recall the first television in my parent's house, as I was a small boy when they bought it. We received one television station at the time. Getting cable, when we did, in the 1970s was a huge deal. It was a topic of common adult conversation.

Computers have really changed things. And will continue to. But not as much as the automobile did, or at least its debatable it will. In some ways, the computer may actually have a long term effect of countering some things that the automobile caused. At any rate, the transportation and communications changes of the first half of the 20th Century can hardly be underestimated.

[Pat Holscher]

Rosalie Kunert, nee Merritt, age 86, of Burbank California died on June 28. She was moved to California in 1942 to work at Lockeed in war construction. At the plant she was approached to appear in a wartime production promotion film, but declined. She was approached due to her appearance. Her appearance, and first name, became the inspiration for WWII's Rosie the Riveter, although other women also had a role in inspiring the popular wartime image.

[Pat Holscher]

Darrell "Shifty" Powers, familiar to readers or viewers of Ambrose's Band of Brothers died on June 17.

Powers was an enlisted man in the 101st Airborne and almost defines the rural American in wartime service. He was from a small town in Virgina and had learned to be a marksman as he was found of hunting in civilian life. He returned to Virgina after the war, although his return was very much delayed as he was severely injured in an automobile accident as a passenger after he had been chosen to return to the United States early. He worked for a coal mine after the war.

Powers character was so close to the movie type portrayal of rural Americans from the 40s that we would never see a fictional character depicted this way now. He was a crack shot, very unassuming, and generally an all around good guy according to his fellows. Even in the interviews of him made during the filming of Band of Brothers he was unassuming, noting that had he met individuals Germans that he fought in peacetime, they might have been friends, as they might have liked to "fish and hunt". Gary Cooper's portrayal of Tennessean Alvin York, who also met this character description, comes to mind.

[Jim Bewley]

Last member of the RAF from WWI dies.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/co ... =sec-world

Jim

[Pat Holscher]

Last member of the RAF from WWI dies.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/co ... =sec-world

Jim

Wow. I'm stunned that there was a member of the original RAF left alive in 2009. Amazing.

[Pat Holscher]

Walter Cronkite passed away yesterday at age 92.

He will be mostly remembered for being a television news anchorman, and a very good one at that, but he started off as a correspondent in World War Two. His recollection of landing in a glider in operation Market Garden is a classic, and is included in the book A Bridge Too Far.

More controversially, he is sometimes credited with helping to turn the tide of American public opinion against the Vietnam War following the Tet Offensive, but I think that may frankly be quite overstated.

[John Tremelling]

Henry Allingham, 6 June 1896 to 18 July 2009, joined RNAS, last surviving member of original RAF, worlds oldest man, died aged 113


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Allingham

John T

[John Tremelling]

Harry Patch, the last Brit to fight in the trenches of the Great War died today aged 111 years. He was a Westo from Somerset, and Served in the Duke of Cornwalls Light Infantry. I wonder if Cider contributed to his longevity?

John T

[detriquette]

Cider might well have contributed to his logevity. I, however, hold to the advice of Roger Moore, who when asked what the secret was for his lasting good looks and vitality replied, "I always drink my whisky out of a claen glass". Now those are words to live by.
Tom
"Deus Dux et ferro comitante"

[Pat Holscher]

Willard Varnell Oliver, USMC Navajo code talker.

http://navajotimes.com/news/2009/1009/101509oliver.php

[Pat Holscher]

Freya von Moltke, member of the German resistance, and wife of Helmuth von Moltke who was executed following the July 20 plot, died at 98, in Vermont. She was a naturalized U.S. citizen.

The Von Moltke's were lawyers of aristocratic birth. Their estate in Silesia was located at Kreisau, now in Poland, and their ring of anti Nazis has come to be known as the Kreisau Circle. Helmuth Von Moltke was not a member of the plot, and was already under arrest at the time it took place.

[Pat Holscher]

John Henry Foster Babcock, the last known Canadian veteran of World War One, died this past Thursday at his home in Spokane Washington. The Kingston Ontario farm boy was the last of ten siblings, and had joined the Canadian Army underaged, when he was 15. He later served in the U.S. Army from 1921 through 1924. He had lived in Spokane, where he worked as an electrician, since the 1930s.

[Pat Holscher]

Jockey and author Dick Francis passed away this past week at age 89.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/co ... eheadlines